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WORLD POLICY JOURNAL
Facts of
Life Not surprisingly, as we approached the first anniversary of 9/11 we found ourselves drowning in a deluge of long-winded, repetitious, but not particularly enlightening commentaries by the fraternity of foreign policy "experts" and assorted media pundits, all purporting to explain—in one fell swoop—the "new" global terrorism, the "clash of civilizations," the "true meaning" of radical Islam, and the deeper "lessons" of history. What was the average, harried citizen supposed to make of all this ostensibly learned analysis and advice? One was reminded of the late Alexander Bickel’s famous throwaway line. When asked, at some Yale alumni function, "What is happening to morality today?" the great constitutional scholar replied, "It threatens to engulf us." 1 Here, then, are some simple facts of life, one year later. First, 9/11 was a sorely needed wake-up call—for the Bush administration, the American people, and our friends abroad— on the scandalous inefficiency of the U.S. intelligence and security services during most of the preceding decade, as well as on the lack of proper coordination and cooperation between the CIA, the FBI, and their counter-parts in Britain, France, Germany, and points east. Today, do we see any tangible evidence of improvements at any level? It is hard to say, but the woeful pre-9/11 failures have certainly encouraged Americans of all ideological stripes to focus on the crying need for more reliable intelligence gathering— not least because of the ongoing debate over our Iraq policy options. At the same time, equally disturbing have been the more recent revelations of ineptitude at the highest levels of the National Security Council in the early weeks of the Bush administration: of specific warnings about al-Qaeda presented by the departing Clintonites but not heeded, of various leads not followed up assiduously enough by Condoleezza Rice and her team in the months before 9/11. 2 To be sure, these were not only American failures. Nor is effective international cooperation ever easy to come by in areas a hundred times more sensitive and dangerous than those involving Interpol investigations of stolen museum paintings. Still, we all know now what for far too long we preferred to disregard: that both the CIA and the FBI are in need of serious overhaul. 3 Second, 9/11 has made it more clear than ever that—as in the bad old days of the Cold War, when Washington went to bed with the likes of Mobutu, Pinochet, Marcos, Suharto, the Shah of Iran, and the Greek colonels’ junta, ostensibly better to "contain" the Soviet menace—whether it offends our democratic sensibilities or not, we continue to be hostages to a number of unsavory foreign governments. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan come immediately to mind. Certain mischievous critics would gleefully add Russia, China, Turkey, and even Sharon’s Israel to this list—whose help, we are told, we need in our war against terrorism, not to speak of more ambitious initiatives involving "regime change" or "nation building." There is indeed no easy way out of this predicament. But one does sense that the greater American public is gradually beginning to appreciate the complexities of international power politics and the unavoidably ugly choices often confronting our government. At the same time, more people—and not only the proverbial foreign policy elite —understand that (in the words of the editor of this magazine) "being grown up about power politics does not mean that we have to pretend that all our foreign partners are ‘democrats’ or that we can’t criticize their follies: Russia’s abuses in Chechnya, Pakistan’s proposed constitutional changes, Turkey’s human rights record, Egypt’s repression of dissidents." 4 In a word, Americans are asking today for more persuasive explanations, and reasonable justifications, for whatever quasi-Faustian bargains Washington insists it must make in the near term. There is indeed a new, healthy, and refreshing skepticism permeating public discourse in the United States over the "indispensability" (and utility) of our commitments to certain of our long-time "allies" who, in a number of cases, are not even behaving as such. Similarly, more Americans are demonstrably dissatisfied today with misleading catch-all labels ("axis of evil") or simplistic "doctrines" ("multilateralism" vs. "unilateralism"), quite properly arguing instead that what we really need is a clearer definition of goals: what exactly is it we hope to achieve (or avoid), and within what (reasonable) time frame, at what cost, and with what prospects of success? Better yet, 9/11 forced into the open the beginnings of a more rigorous discussion of the enduring relevance— to the American case—of Lord Palmerston’s much-quoted aphorism to the effect that England had neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies, only permanent interests. Third, paradoxically enough, the events of last September 11 pushed the Iraq issue to the very top of the Bush foreign policy agenda. I say paradoxically only because, to this day, no truly compelling evidence has surfaced connecting Saddam with the attacks at the World Trade Center or the Pentagon. Yet in ways that even the most hawkish of the president’s advisers could not have foreseen, the trauma of 9/11 allowed the White House to mount a full-throttle public relations campaign in favor of "regime change" in Baghdad, by military force if need be. And a good thing, too, one might add. For whatever one’s views on the threats against international peace and American security posed by Iraq, what we now see before us—at least in this country—is the extraordinary spectacle of an honest-to-goodness public debate over a foreign policy issue of the greatest importance; and this at a relatively early stage of policymaking. If this is not a ringing vindication of Churchill’s faith in the admittedly imperfect and frustrating workings of the democratic process ("the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time"), I don’t know what is. Fourth, lest we start patting ourselves on the back a bit too energetically, 9/11 also provided us with a disconcerting look into the nonworkings of the Bush foreign policy team. To be sure, heated policy arguments and quasi-public disagreements among high officials are the stuff of democratic politics: not pretty to behold, but not (necessarily) entirely unhealthy either. Who can forget Truman vs. MacArthur, Johnson vs. Robert Kennedy, Brzezinski vs. Vance, Shultz vs. Weinberger? Yet who remembers witnessing anything quite as ludicrous as the opera bouffe played out over much of the past spring and summer—and recorded, almost daily—in the front pages of the nation’s newspapers? Do the president and his closest national security advisers actually have an integrated long-term strategy that together makes sense of the war on terrorism, the potential war against Saddam, relations with friends and allies, and our many other.Facts of Life 53 foreign policy headaches—be they the Middle East peace process, nation building in the Balkans, Latin American economic crises, or the, to my mind, absurd crusade against the International Criminal Court? Even more to the point, what were we supposed to make of the seemingly intentional marginalization of the secretary of state these many months? 5 And what of Colin Powell’s own perplexing behavior? I use the word "behavior" advisedly: for I am no longer sure I know where Mr. Powell really stands either in terms of core beliefs or specific policy preferences. To be sure, it now looks, following the hectic round of speechmaking and behind- the-scenes negotiations in New York that coincided with the somber observance of the first anniversary of 9/11, as if the president and his secretary of state are finally on the same page—at least when it comes to short-term diplomatic maneuverings regarding Iraq. But how can we be sure, given what went on for so long? What will happen if, as is highly probable, Saddam remains obstinately uncooperative and obstructionist? Will Secretary of State Powell join forces with the Cheney-Rumsfeld "junta"? Even if he again disagrees with their (new) recommendations to the president? And if he doesn’t join forces, then what? Here is a man reportedly "adored" by his colleagues at State, while also lionized at home and abroad as a man of integrity, moderation, high intelligence, and common sense. Yet for over a year and a half, Secretary Powell allowed himself—again and again—to be bypassed, contradicted, under-cut, and literally humiliated by various members of Bush’s "inner circle," with the president himself all the while looking on in seeming detachment. It is suggested by Mr. Powell’s admirers that we should thank our lucky stars for having someone of his mettle in charge at Foggy Bottom; that we should tip our hat to him for being so patient, so persevering, so diplomatic, so loyal a servant of the crown. In truth, the secretary of state will be doing no one any great favor if he reverts to his nonconfrontational style—were he to hold views once again diametrically opposed to those of the president. Mr. Powell cannot be all things to all people. If the White House will not listen to him on matters of crucial importance, he should resign—and allow President Bush to get himself a new secretary of state more in tune with his own views. On the morrow of this terrible first anniversary, we deserve—and should expect— to be better served by our leaders in Washington. —September 18, 2002 *Nicholas X. Rizopoulos is academic director of the Honors College, Adelphi University, and senior research associate at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs.
1. The story appears, inter alia, in Nelson W. Polsby, "In Praise of Alexander M. Bickel," Commentary, January 1976, p. 52. 2. See the long article by Michael Elliott (with Massimo Calabresi et al.) "They Had a Plan," Time , August 12, 2002, pp. 28–43. 3. See, inter alia, Thomas Powers, "The Secret Intelligence Wars," New York Review of Books, September 26, 2002, pp. 32–35. 4. Conversation with the author. 5. See Morton Abramowitz, "Foreign Policy In-fighting," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, August 26, 2002, p. 27. [Go to interactive discussion forum]
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