Nigeria: Bellwether of African Democracy
O. Carl Unegbu*

Nigeria is a riddle. With its 125 million in-habitants, it is Africa’s most populous nation, and given its abundant human and natural resources, it seemed destined to be-come a regional colossus. It didn’t happen. Seen from abroad, indeed, few countries have become so famous for all the wrong reasons. Television viewers know Nigeria as the country where some 200 people died last November in riots protesting their country’s hosting a Miss World competition (the pageant moved to London). In news columns, Nigeria is known as the land ranked for three successive years as the world’s second most corrupt country by Transparency International, a German-based monitoring group. On the World Wide Web, Nigeria is notoriously associated with spam e-mails headed "Urgent Reply" or "Confidential," promising riches beyond belief to those gullible enough to supply confidential banking information, a scam garnering an estimated $100 million annually from mostly elderly Americans.

Viewed closely, the puzzle deepens. Despite oil revenues of $280 billion over three decades, Nigeria seems trapped in a poor-house, with most of its people earning less than a dollar a day, according to the World Bank. Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has tried five constitutions under twelve leaders, most of them soldiers. And yet, there remains in Nigeria a deep and wide-spread commitment to democracy. Should democracy succeed there, it will dramatically improve chances for democracy else-where in sub-Saharan Africa.

Like its continental neighbors, Nigeria currently grapples with all the perplexities of self-rule. Now in its fourth republic since winning independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria is once again heading into multiparty elections at the local, state, and national level. Its April elections will be the first to be organized by civilian authorities since the Fourth Republic was established on May 29, 1999.

But unlike its sub-Saharan neighbors, Nigeria is not your typical African country. Before the advent in 1994 of majority rule in South Africa under Nelson Mandela, Nigeria was unrivaled as the dominant regional power, with respectable credentials in its decolonization efforts in the 1970s, and then in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 1990s. Today, even with South Africa as a partner in continental affairs, Nigeria provides the more credible litmus of democracy’s future in sub-Saharan Africa.

Not only does Nigeria have a longer history of acceptable involvement in African affairs, but its economic and social conditions are more representative of the deplorable situation in other African countries than those in South Africa. Indigenous black Africans have dominated Nigeria’s social, political, and economic affairs since independence. By contrast, despite the recent political dominance of black South Africans, their country’s social and economic sectors continue to be dominated by whites.

Thus by strengthening its own fledgling democracy, Nigeria can take the first step to fortifying the same impulse elsewhere. Yet success in Nigeria this fourth time around hinges critically on how well the country and its political class address the familiar demons that have wrecked democracy three times previously. It was the failure of past civilian administrations to organize credible elections that provided the proximate trigger for the abolition of democracy by the Nigerian military in 1966 and 1983.

A Difficult History
Across sub-Saharan Africa one can discern growing support for the adoption of a democratic political culture. In the past decade, key countries have organized multiparty elections, as in Ghana, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Long-ruling autocratic leaders in one-party systems have voluntarily stepped down, as occurred last December in Kenya. This new dispensation has been a response to both external and internal pressure. For instance, the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), adopted by African leaders in 2001, which is now the blueprint for African economic and social development in partnership with the developed world, explicitly requires ascertainable progress toward more democratic and transparent systems. Moreover, under the framework of the newly formed African Union, which has replaced the former Organization of African Unity, a peer-review mechanism is envisaged through which African countries are to reciprocally monitor each other’s progress toward democracy.

Another initiative conditioned on greater democracy is the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, adopted by the United States in 2000 as a mechanism to promote greater trade and investment opportunities. This law increases market access to the United States for sub-Saharan African exports by means of relaxing quotas and tariffs. To qualify, African countries are required to implement political and economic reforms that would include the abolition of child labor, the elimination of unfair treatment of women, respect for intellectual property rights, and fair treatment of foreign investment.

Nigeria, like most sub-Saharan nations, carries the burden of a difficult history. Its conquest and colonization by Great Britain began in 1861. Over ensuing decades, the diverse peoples who make up present-day Nigeria were brought together in one country not from any desire on their part for a union, but solely by the will and for the administrative convenience of their erstwhile masters. In fact, on the eve of national independence in 1960, some 99 years later, the boundaries and composition of the country were still being determined. A referendum was held to determine the status of Southern Cameroon, which voted to leave Eastern Nigeria for the country’s French-speaking neighbor, Cameroon.

One needs to recall that the 1884–85 Berlin Conference formalized the division of Africa among European colonial powers, initiating the so-called Scramble for Africa. The unfortunate results were two-fold. One was the establishment of arbitrary frontiers throughout sub-Saharan Africa, which planted the seeds for interminable boundary disputes. Witness the recent controversy stemming from a World Court ruling last October that awarded the disputed oil-rich Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon over Nigeria’s claim.

Another result was the dumping together into colonies (subsequently "independent countries") of disparate peoples with no common bonds of history, culture, or shared prior experiences. Because these ethnic groups (which before colonialism had been nations in their own right) had divergent cultures and interests, conflict was inevitable in the ensuing competition over the largesse of government.

A Genuine Democratic System
In Nigeria, with its 36 states, conflict has been recurrent between the predominantly Muslim north, home of the Hausa people, and Christians concentrated in the south, home of the Ibo and Yoruba peoples. This led to a brutal civil war from 1967 to 1970, in which about a million people died. In the past decade, ethno-cultural differences have combined with religious differences to wreak untold havoc on the country’s social and political fabric. In the nearly four years since the return of democracy in Nigeria, it is estimated that more than 10,000 people have been killed in clashes between ethnic, cultural, and/or religious groups. More violence is anticipated in the run-up to the April elections as politicians play on these differences for narrow gains. Hence the clamor for convening a so-called sovereign national conference to decide the character and direction of the country’s federation. One may reasonably ask, how will the establishment of a democratic culture relieve this problem in Nigeria, or elsewhere?

Nigeria’s diversity is not, as in the United States, the result of a formal and voluntary compact among constituent groups, but the product of the administrative convenience of British colonial rulers. Nevertheless, from a utilitarian perspective, a genuine democratic system based on majority rule and consensus building has real utility. A democratic system pushes its constituent groups to form alliances and make deals in the process of forming a national consensus reflecting the common denominators of shared national aspirations. Logically, the quest for shared aspirations can frustrate the schemes for dominion by any one group over the others. Thus initiatives that are palpably in the national interest and not designed for oppression will have a good chance of becoming public policy.

In addition, a democratic dispensation in Nigeria can provide the best conditions for economic development. In this regard, one notes that a democratic political order often involves elaborate protections of economic liberties as well. Thus a free-market economy based on individual enterprise and fair competition can best afford the long underperforming, protectionist Nigerian economy the benefits of efficient allocation of resources. Such a reordering would also help the country attract much-needed development capital. Sub-Saharan Africa currently garners less than 2 percent of all foreign direct investment bound for the developing world, even though the rate of return on direct investment is higher in Africa than in comparable regions of the world.

At the individual level, democracy offers the ordinary Nigerian citizen the best chance to live under a regime of fair laws enacted in the national interest, as opposed to the familiar tyranny of crude military despots. Furthermore, a democratic order will prove conducive to the evolution of a culture of debate and the unfettered exchange of ideas, a process that can be energized by Nigeria’s traditionally vigorous and outspoken free press.

Why Past Attempts Failed
For the fourth time in its 42 years of independence, Nigeria finds itself trying to honor its professed democratic principles. Three previous attempts were interrupted by military interventions, in 1966, 1983, and 1994, respectively. Historians and political observers have offered a familiar litany of explanations for the previous failures: ethnicity (tribalism), vandalism, violence, rigging of elections, an illiterate population, poverty, and so forth. But two factors can be singled out as broadly posing the greatest source of popular disillusionment concerning the utility of democracy. One is corruption, the other an abysmal lack of law enforcement at the local, state, and federal levels. Both conditions tend to reinforce each other. Corruption festers because government officials are reluctant to enforce the law and proceed against their accomplices.

Nigerians other than members of the political elite often judge democracy by how much positive impact it has had on their lives compared to military dictatorships. This could hardly be otherwise since, as already noted, an estimated two-thirds of the citizenry live on less than $1 a day. This poverty helps explain the false hope that things might somehow improve under opportunistic and no less corrupt military regimes. Corruption in turn wreaks havoc on the country’s infrastructure and essential social services, since funds meant to secure these objectives are embezzled by government officials or otherwise diverted to non-beneficial ends. The climate of nonenforcement of laws has emboldened corrupt officials to extend their actions to the electoral process. Hence electoral officials confidently collude in outright rigging of elections, which in turn offers a seemingly convincing excuse for military intervention. Nonenforcement of laws contributes to spiraling violence as unscrupulous politicians manipulate latent ethnic and religious tensions to their own advantage.

Sadly, after nearly four years of democracy, Nigeria’s political elite appears to have gone mad again. A report on the revenue and expenditure of the Nigerian government released in January by the auditor general provided a detailed indictment of gross financial laxity and disregard of financial guidelines by members of the federal government, including leaders of the National Assembly, officials in the federal ministries and parastatals (government-owned corporations and agencies in which private investors may be permitted some ownership interest), members of the judiciary, and the executive.

In one bizarre instance, the report re-counts that gasoline for a government vehicle was purchased at three times its physical capacity, in Abuja, the nation’s capital. The person signing the receipts purchased gasoline at different petrol stations in different sections of the city. More brazenly yet, the vehicle itself was never physically present in Abuja on the date the purchases were purportedly made. Yet such details tend not to shock and outrage Nigerians, who have long since become inured to such outright theft and betrayal by public officials. Not even the reported looting of more than $3 billion of state funds by the family of the former military dictator, Gen. Sani Abacha, shocked the long-defrauded populace.

The nexus between corruption and lack of law enforcement is borne out by the fact that since the latest turn to democracy in Nigeria, no public official of any significance has been prosecuted by the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Commission (ICPC), the so-called anti-graft commission, during its more than two years of existence. In the few instances in which the commission began to move against officials, those targeted were political opponents of the president and other executive branch personnel.

Another dangerous consequence of the willful neglect of law enforcement is the climate of impunity that has been created. The impunity manifests itself in various ways. One instance is the bitter religious controversy currently dividing Nigeria. Shortly after the inauguration of the Fourth Republic in 1999, some governors in northern states introduced the criminal component of the Islamic code of law known as Sharia, which prescribes various brutal punishments, including death by stoning for adultery and amputation of limbs for such offenses as the theft of goats. The death sentence imposed on Amina Lawal, a peasant woman condemned for having a child out of wedlock, stirred a global outcry. "The best deterrent is the death sentence, for people to see what happens to a fornicator," said the judge in the case, Grand Khadi Aminu Ibrahim Katsina. (The sentence was overturned on appeal on technical grounds.)

In fact, the introduction of the Sharia code on its face violates the secular constitution of Nigeria, which does not permit the imposition of the code’s provisions in criminal cases. Remarkably, before late 1999, the country had never had a Sharia problem, as previous attempts during the Second Republic (1979–83) to introduce a federal Sharia court of appeal were defeated on constitutional grounds. But this time, reacting to perceived shifts of power from the northern Muslims to the southern Christians, some northern governors played the familiar divisive religion card in a bid to increase their chances for national office. When the Sharia problem first began in northern Zamfara State, President Olusegun Obasanjo dismissed it as "political Sharia" (referring to the political ploy behind the issue) that would go away on its own. But recognizing the federal government’s unwillingness to enforce the commands of the constitution and protect the rights of all Nigerian citizens (Muslims and Christians alike) residing in the affected states, other northern governors soon followed suit and within months Sharia had been introduced in 12 northern states.

As Christians protested the introduction of Sharia in the north, their dissent provoked rioting and the killing of Christians and non-Hausas, followed by revenge killings of Muslims and ethnic Hausa and Fulanis living in the south. Today, the newly, and needlessly, introduced religion issue has mixed with the old ethnic contentions to bring the country to the brink of graver violence. In the case of the riots surrounding the Miss World Pageant, Nigerian authorities failed to identify and prosecute the political chieftains and other potentates promoting the violence.

None of this bodes well for the April elections. According to the supervising Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), more than 2 million forged fingerprints have been used in fraudulent multiple registrations. Worse, the commission has had its own internal problems, not least being the ongoing investigation of one of its former commissioners, who has been implicated in a bribery scandal.

Despite these problems, Nigerians appear determined to support the democratic course, whatever the expected flaws in the upcoming elections. Having experienced military rule, Nigerians appear to have calculated that a flawed democracy is better than no democracy at all.

Glimmers of Hope
There are glimmers of hope. Despite a challenging and constraining environment, the media and judiciary have earned a passing grade in the new dispensation. Nongovernmental organizations have also weighed in positively, and in so doing, have emerged as the guardians and perhaps the best hope for the survival of Nigerian democracy. The Nigerian media remain the freest in sub-Saharan Africa. Broadcasting is largely under government control, but privately owned newspapers have flourished in the Fourth Republic and have operated without undue official interference. Granted, the print media have at times verged on the inflammatory, but it is a positive sign that the system has erred on the side of freedom rather than restriction.

For its part, the judiciary has affirmed its independence in its handling of important constitutional matters. Notable examples include the Supreme Court’s authoritative pronouncements last year on the onshore/ offshore dispute over revenue allocation between the federal government and the states (the so-called resource control controversy) and its handling of the controversy surrounding the Electoral Act of 2001, in which the court struck down the attempts by the National Assembly to increase the tenure of the 774 local government councils in the country to four years, from the three years prescribed by the constitution.

Other bold moves include the court’s overruling last November of the unduly onerous guidelines adopted by the INEC for the registration of new political parties, which subsequently led to the expansion of the political space with the registration of an additional 24 political parties, bringing the total to 30. Also, the court’s action in June 2002, upholding the validity of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Related Offenses Commission and its nationwide jurisdiction is another healthy development for the political system. One may reasonably hope that the media and the judiciary will hold the line and assert themselves as the country navigates the nasty shoals of this election year.

How Others Can Help
Obviously, assistance from the outside world can contribute significantly to the democratic advance in Nigeria and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. The pressing need for development aid puts other countries, especially in the industrialized world, in a good position to insist on responsible governance as a condition for help. Beyond the humanitarian rationale for assisting Africa, there is also a case rooted in strategic and national security interests. Terrorist groups find an easy foothold in impoverished countries where hopelessness reigns. Poorer countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, are the weakest link in the global fight against terrorism. Democratic societies and the well-being they can nourish can counter the temptation of weak, failed states to provide havens to terrorists.

Developed countries have, in principle, already embraced a number of initiatives aimed at encouraging democracy in Africa. But the United States, more than any other country, is in the best position to insist on good governance and responsible reforms in a bellwether country like Nigeria, given its avowed democratic credentials and economic clout. Not only does Nigeria practice American-style presidential democracy, but with its large population and plurality of ethnic groups it is similar in character to the United States, and Nigerians could draw important lessons from America’s success in reconciling diversity with democracy. Given these parallels, the United States would do well to adopt a zero-tolerance attitude toward Nigerian-style corruption and lawlessness. The United States could, for instance, condition further collaboration with the Nigerian government on the adoption of greater transparency in government as well as respect for the rule of law and constitutional processes.

The effectiveness of such an approach was demonstrated late last year in the larger context of the war on terrorism when the United States and its partners in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development insisted that Nigeria reform its disreputable banking system and adopt new banking laws and regulations to choke off the funding of terrorists and other criminals. The penalty for failure to comply was a curb on letters of credit and other financial penalties. Less than two days before the December 15 deadline set for compliance, the Nigerian government passed the Economic and Financial Crimes (Establishment) Bill of 2002, to avoid the sting of economic sanctions. The Nigerian president dragged the national parliament, kicking and screaming, into abandoning a proposed watered-down version of the law in favor of a version that conformed to international standards as required by the OECD’s Financial Action Task Force. Prior to this momentous event, the country’s banking and financial regulations were made deliberately ineffective to allow corrupt officials and their cohorts to siphon illicit money back and forth at their whim.

Such are the difficulties in persuading the Nigerian political elite to do the right thing. Still, it would be a great aid to Nigeria and other African countries if Washington were to insist on good governance even in situations where America’s national security interests are not directly affected. The goal of creating a more democratic and transparent world in and of itself ought to be justification enough for applying effective pressure.

In the Nigerian context, external pressure alone may not suffice, but it can complement the work of domestic forces already pushing for positive change. Elections are rightly considered significant hallmarks of a democratic system, and not coincidentally election rigging (or stealing) has triggered the demise of Nigeria’s earlier attempts at democracy, in 1966 and 1983. Therefore, Nigeria’s elections this year offer the next big opportunity for domestic and outside forces to collaborate in pressuring the long irresponsible Nigerian political elite to give democracy a fighting chance.

*O. Carl Unegbu is a Nigerian-born American lawyer and journalist.