| ARTICLE:
Volume XXII, No 1, Spring 2005 |
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WORLD
POLICY JOURNAL
The Unipolar Concert: The
North-South Divide Trumps Transatlantic Differences
Mohammed
Ayoob and Matthew Zierler*
An article in the New York Times on the
eve of the 2004 U.S. presidential election began by asserting that
the predominant view in Europe seemed to be that "no matter
who wins...the consequences for American-European relations will
be bad" and that neither France nor Germany, the linchpins
of the Continent's transatlantic relationship, would be willing
to come to the aid of the United States in Iraq regardless of the
outcome.1 Analyses such as this one tend to portray
America's relations with major European powers in one-dimensional
terms. They assume everything hinges on Iraq and ignore the dense
web of interlocking security and economic interests that bind industrialized
Western Europe and America together. As Harvard's Jospeh S. Nye,
Jr. has said in refuting the conservative political analyst Robert
Kagan's assertion that when it comes to their approach to major
strategic and international questions Europeans and Americans are
from two different planets: "In their relations with each other
all advanced democracies are from Venus."2
This commonality of interests was emphasized
by Condoleezza Rice in her first trip abroad as secretary of state.
Washington's relations with France and Germany had been severely
strained by the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq, and
Rice was on a fence-mending mission. In a major foreign policy speech
on February 8 in Paris, she declared, "History will surely
judge us not by our old disagreements but by our new achievements."3
This essay suggests that although substantial
changes to the international system have occurred since the end
of the Cold War, the relationship among the industrial, affluent,
powerful countries of the North basically has not been altered.
This is because these relationships were only partly driven by the
Soviet threat. They were driven as much, if not more, by the need
to protect the interests of Western industrialized states vis-à-vis
the majority of other states. It was recognized even during the Cold War era that potentially
serious threats to the economic and security interests of the powerful
and affluent countries could arise elsewhere, especially from the
more recalcitrant, radical states in the South.
This assumed there was a "structural conflict"
between North and South, and that this was likely to drive the states
of the South to "gang up" on the North and use their numbers
in international organizations to push through agendas deleterious
to the interests of the industrialized powers. The Stanford political
scientist Stephen Krasner made this argument cogently and forcefully
in 1985, when he advised the North to "disengage" as far
as feasible from the South. He considered this essential to prevent the North's undue
dependence, especially in the economic sphere, on a web of intertwining
relationships with potential adversaries.4
The weakness of Krasner's analysis was that it
attributed greater cohesion to Third World states than they possessed.
He also overestimated their will and capacity to challenge the industrialized
countries on issues vital to the latter. He did so because he ignored
the vulnerabilities of individual postcolonial states, including
the major oil producers such as Saudi Arabia, and their consequent
dependence in economic and security matters on the North. Such dependence
gravely hampered the translation of their collective rhetoric into
meaningful collective action.5 Despite these shortcomings, Krasner's
diagnosis that the interests of North and South diverged, and continue
to diverge, in the economic and political arenas was not far off
the mark.
From the perspective of the rich and the powerful,
post-Cold War events have increased the saliency of challenges emerging
from the South, whether in the form of political Islam (especially
in its more extreme manifestations), "rogue" states engaged
in clandestine proliferation activities, or forces that resist globalization
in the economic as well as cultural spheres, perceiving it to be
deleterious to their interests. A recent study sponsored by the
Council of Foreign Relations and co-chaired by Henry Kissinger and
Lawrence Summers concludes: "There is a consensus within the
transatlantic community on the numerous challenges facing common
interests. These include terrorism, authoritarianism, economic incompetence,
environmental degradation, and the kind of misrule that exacerbates
poverty, encourages discrimination, tolerates illiteracy, allows
epidemics, and proliferates weapons of mass destruction."6 This
is a polite way of saying that the major threats to international
order as conceived in the capitals of the North come from the South,
particularly from those forces the major powers cannot control.
In truth, there are striking continuities
between the Cold War and post°Cold War
eras, especially in the political and economic
relations between North and South.
It is no coincidence, therefore, that North-
South relations are increasingly taking center
stage in contemporary international affairs.
The divisions between North and
South are particularly evident in their differences
over the American-led invasion of
Iraq, the Israel-Palestine conflict, and humanitarian
intervention, as well as over major
economic issues relating to trade barriers,
foreign investment, and questions of
equity concerning intellectual copyright and
patents.
Neatly dividing international relations
into distinct phases often obscures an enduring
continuum. The end of the Cold War
did end competition between the United
States and the Soviet Union in the strategic
arena. However, this by itself did not lead to
a fundamental restructuring of international
politics. Analysts of the post°Cold War era
who argue that systemic change came about
with the end of the superpower rivalry ignore
the fact that todayØs key issuesi.e.,
globalization, multilateralism, and fundamentalism
have their roots in the Cold
War and before.7
Structure and Process in the Global Order
Joseph Nye, in his book Understanding International
Conflicts, writes of structure and
process: "The structure of a system refers to
its distribution of power, and the process
refers to patterns and types of interaction
among its units."8 Logically, in order to explain
the process by which states interact
whether they act multilaterally or unilaterally,
or how they respond to economic or
military pressuresit is necessary to understand
the structure of the international
system.
However, Nye's definition of structure
is unduly restrictive if by the distribution
of power he means only the allocation of
capabilities among the major powers. Such
a definition may suffice for neo-realists (and
Nye cannot be counted among them), but
it ignores the fact that the distribution of
capabilities between the strong and the
weak is as important as it is among the
strong themselves. This is the case because
this gap in capabilities determines in large
measure the structural power that powerful
states wield in particular areas as well as in
the international system as a whole. It is
the variable that explains the concentration
of power as opposed to its mere distribution.
It is essential to understand this phenomenon
of concentration in order to comprehend
the nature and degree of structural
dominance in international society and its
long-term consequences.
The current era is certainly different
from the Cold War in that the United
States is not only the most powerful state
in the international system but that there
is no credible challenger to its preeminence.
Describing the current distribution of power
as unipolar is, on its surface, not terribly
problematic.9 But every redistribution of
power does not automatically lead states to
discard the patterns of behavior that have
existed beforehand. Furthermore, unlike
earlier major changes, for example in the
aftermath of the two world wars, the recent
redistribution of power did not result from
violent upheavals. The relatively peaceful
transition from bipolarity to unipolarity
has not resulted in major disruptions in
patterns of state behavior, in existing alliance
relationships, or in the rules and
norms governing the system. Consequently,
unlike the aftermath of the world wars,
when new power relations and the rules
governing them had to be established
afresh, the transition to American unipolarity
did not mean that the relationships developed
during the prior 50 years suddenly
disappeared.
The continuity is evident not only in
the relationships among the states of the
North, but also in North-South relations.
Indeed, the end of the Cold War has made
issues of North-South asymmetry more
salient. The new vocabulary of post°Cold
War analysis, which developed in American
and European academiaemphasizing
terms such as ²globalization," "unipolarity,"
and "multilateralism," and the apparent
tensions among themmay succeed
in concealing these continuities, but analysts
with a keen sense of history and sociology,
not to mention economics, realize
that in many spheres the post°Cold War
era is the linear descendant of the Cold War
period.
A "Unipolar Concert"
Superficially, there seems a tremendous
tension today between the conception of a
unipolar world that enshrines the dominance
of the United States and the dramatic
advent of globalization that simultaneously
promises economic integration throughout
the international system. The terms "unipolarity"
and "globalization" are often juxtaposed
as if they are antithetical to each other
or, at the least, in a state of friction. However,
a deeper analysis suggests that the two
actually complement each other. Both underwrite
the same power relations in the international
system. They are instruments for
advancing the interests of the dominant
concert of powersan overlapping group of
actors that can be termed the Concert of the
North Atlantic, plus Japanin all major
spheres of international activity.
This club of rich and powerful states,
now known as the North, seemingly concluded
in the aftermath of the Second
World War that it was in the interest of its
members to act in concert. The club's motivation
was rooted not only in the presumed
threat from the Soviet Union. It was motivated
in equal measure by the need to protect
its interests, indeed its dominance, over
the international system from the economic
and political claims of the newly independent
states that emerged from colonial subjugation.
The need to do so had become
particularly urgent because, with decolonization,
the states of the West/North were
rendered a numerical minority, and the new
entrants began to clamor for "justice," "representation,"
and, in some cases, "reparations"
in the form of transfer of resources
from the North to the South.10 That such
concerted action was deemed necessary by
the industrialized powers was clearly
demonstrated by the negotiations during
the 1970s on the New International Economic
Order, as promoted by the South.
These ended without agreement because the
North, led by the United States, was unwilling
to lessen its privileged position.11
The conviction that the industrialized
states must act together was reinforced by
the end of the Cold War, which removed the
veneer of superpower competition from the
reality of a North-South division that was
economic, political, military and, arguably,
civilizational and cultural. This understanding
was reflected in the popularity in the
North of the neoliberal argument that absolute
gains for all are bound to outweigh
relative gains if only the market is allowed
to determine economic outcomes unhindered
by political and governmental interference.
12 This argument discerned, among
other things, a common interest among the affluent in cooperating to further their economic and security goals.
More importantly, the neoliberal rhetoric
provided a cover for the realist foundations
on which North-South relations, in
the economic as well as the political-military
fields, were and continue to be based.
The Australian scholar James Richardson
makes this point. Neoliberalism, he argues,
has "a striking resemblance to certain forms
of realism. Both seek to reinforce the interests
of the powerful by enjoining accommodation
to them.... The major contrast is
that realism places power at the center of its
theorizing, whereas neoliberalism shows its
respect for power through total silence."13
Neoliberalism did yeoman service to the
industrialized countries by promoting the
status quo and making it intellectually respectable
while concealing the element of
raw power that underwrote this status quo.
It did so by implicitly acknowledging the
critical role of power while obfuscating its
importance by means of the absolute gains
rhetoric.
The chasm between North and South
also helps explain the nature of the concert
and its objective of creating an international
order that preserves its privileged position
in the international system while containing
the level of disorder within it, seen as
mostly emanating from the South. Given
the congruence of interests among the industrial
states of the North, America's unrivaled
power does not undermine the unity
of the concert; it augments its power vis-›vis
those outside the concert. Therefore, in
the current context, unipolarity is compatible
with the notion of a concert of powers,
albeit one in which one of the members is
far more powerful than the others and therefore demands and is accorded due deference.
It would be apt to describe it as a "unipolar
concert," a term that depicts both the unrivaled
power of the concert's leader while simultaneously
demonstrating the basic cohesion
of its members' interests.
The use of the term "unipolarity," itself
a derivative of "polarity," in much of the
Western discussion of contemporary international
affairs serves a useful rhetorical purpose
because it hints that a return to the
good old days of balance of power politics is
not far away. By doing so, it diverts analytical
attention from, and thus obscures the reality
of, the real clash of interests between
the strong and affluent represented by the
concert, on the one hand, and the weak and
poor, a much more amorphous group, on the
other. By emphasizing unipolarity and the
tactical differences that emerge from time to
time between the leading power and the
pack it leads, members of the concert hide
the fact that there is agreement among them
about the basic premises on which international
order should be organized. Unipolarity
is, therefore, a convenient veneer by
which much of the blame for excesses committed
on behalf of the concert is shifted to
the leader of the pack, with the other members
of the concert portrayed as "reasonable"
actors unable to control the more rapacious
instincts of the unipolar power. It allows
members of the concert to play the "good
cop, bad cop" routine for the consumption
of those outside the concert.
This became clear in the case of the invasion
of Iraq and, subsequently, on the issue of the presumed threat of Iranian nuclear
proliferation. European powers, especially
France and Germany, were portrayed
in both cases as trying to restrain the aggressively
interventionist proclivities of the
United States. In the case of Iraq, this allowed
them to remain relatively unscathed
while criticism was heaped upon the United
States in the Muslim world and indeed in
much of the South. In the case of Iran, it has
provided them leverage with Tehran; it adds
strength to their argument that if Iran turns
down their "reasonable" offer, the United
States may decide to go it alone and Iran
may have to face dire consequences for its
recalcitrance.
The term "globalization," which has become
synonymous with market fundamentalism,
serves the same purpose of providing
a veneer that hides more than it reveals.
Moreover, it has the added merit of meaning
many things to many people. As the Harvard
professor Graham Allison has pointed
out, "As currently used, globalization is too
often an ill-defined pointer to a disparate array
of phenomenafrequently accompanied
by heavy breathing that implies that behind
these phenomena, or at their root, is some
yet-to-be-discovered substance."14 The term
"globalization" portrays a false image of an
interdependent international economy
where, once again, absolute gains are privileged over relative gains.
This strategy makes a great deal of sense
from the point of view of the concert that
sits atop the international economic structure,
just as it sits atop the international security
structure. It is rational for the powerful
to portray their own relative gains vis-à-vis
the rest as absolute gains for the entire
international society. It also makes great
sense for them to make a strong case that
the status quo that protects, in fact enhances,
the advantages they enjoy is best for
all human kind. But, serious analysts must
not take such claims at face value. The Harvard
political scientist Samuel Huntington
has portrayed this reality bluntly: "The
West is attempting and will continue to attempt
to sustain its preeminent position and
defend its interests by defining those interests
as the interests of the 'world community.'
That phrase has become the euphemistic
collective nounÚto give global legitimacy
to actions reflecting the interests of the
United States and other Western powers."15
Globalization has the potential to augment
inequality both within states and between
them unless it is carefully monitored
and shepherded by sophisticated regulatory
institutions established by the state. This is
the core argument of the economist Joseph
Stiglitz's critique of market-driven globalization.
He has argued convincingly that for
globalization to work effectively and spread
wealth around, it must be a "managed"
process in which democratic governments
exercise more power than the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) or global markets.16
Even the pro-globalization guru, Jagdish
Bhagwati, acknowledges the importance of
appropriate governance to manage globalization
better.17 Unfortunately, there is not
merely a dearth of democratic governments
in the South; most postcolonial states do not
possess the managerial resources to effectively
operate regulatory institutions that would
mitigate the more perverse effects of unfettered
globalization. Consequently, in the developing
world unmanaged globalization
acting through the instrument of indiscriminate
economic liberalization has the potential
to create far more losers than winners.18
Regrettably, multilateral regimes, which
are often portrayed as mechanisms with the
capacity to curtail the more predatory outcomes of free market globalization and economic liberalization, frequently fail to do so. They fail because most such regimes, especially the IMF and the World Bank, reflect
the power inequalities, embodied in the
weighted voting rules under which they operate
within the international system. Those
who wield financial and economic power
heavily influence their decisions. They thus
become a part of the problem rather than a part of the solution. In many ways, they
conform to the political scientist Sean Kay's
definition of globalization. Kay suggests
that "globalization is best understood as a
technologically facilitated proliferation of
the means through which power within the
international system is channeled and pursued."19 Such a nuanced understanding of
globalization forces us to reconsider assumptions
that globalization is a fundamental
break from the power relations of the past
and the harbinger of a new future.
An Artificial Contradiction
Recent disagreements within the concert and an increased tendency toward unilateralism
on the part of the United States,
principally in Iraq but also on issues like
the environment, have many predicting
the demise of the post°Second World War
order and the emergence of an international
system predicated on different sets of relationships.
Some have proclaimed that this
is the "end of the West" as we have known
it in international relations.20 This essay
does not mean to belittle these fissures.
They are in fact quite real in terms of strategy
and tactics. However, we do not believe
that these developments will result in a
radical change in intra-concert relations or
in the use of multilateral mechanisms for
two reasons.
First, the Concert of the North Atlantic
with the United States in the lead
maintains its power in the international system
by exploiting the multilateral regimes
in the financial, trade, and security realms it
has worked so hard to create and maintain
over the last 50 years. It is therefore unlikely
that the United States or the major European
powers will eviscerate a mechanism
that has served them so well for so long.
There have always been disagreements
about the design of specific cooperative institutional
arrangements. While they may
seem more pronounced today, there is nothing
to suggest that powerful states are prepared
to scrap the fundamental features of
the multilateral order over which they
preside.
Second, disagreements within the concert
are often over policy choices, as opposed
to fundamental rules of the system or basic
objectives. Deterring and punishing "rogue"
states and denying unconventional capabilities
to those outside the club are shared objectives
from which no member of the concert
dissents. This was very clear in the runup
to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. A reading
of the U.N. Security Council debates on
Iraq from 1991 to 2003 makes it obvious
that there were hardly any differences
among the club of powerful states on taking
steps that would severely derogate Iraq's
sovereignty and eventually bring about a
regime change. The imposition of no-flight
zones and invasive inspections under U.N.
auspices between 1991 and 2003 clearly
demonstrated this unity of purpose. The
differences were over the tactics to achieve
these ends. The same applies to the concert's
objectives regarding Iran. The shared objective
is to deny Iran nuclear weapons capabilities
and to curb its regional influence;
the debate is about how best to attain these
goals.
A similar situation prevails in the economic
arena. While there may be differences
over details and even intra-concert bickering
about certain issues, for example, the American
attempt to impose tariffs on European
steel, there is a basic consensus about prying
open world markets under the guise of free
trade and liberal investment policies, thus
making it easier for developed countries to
market their high-value-added products and
to invest in profitable ventures abroad. This
is accompanied by imposing conditionalities,
or structural adjustments, on Third
World economies that would ostensibly help
to reduce their fiscal deficits. It is clear that
this can only be achieved through multilateral
mechanisms, such as the World Bank,
the IMF, and the World Trade Organization.
The concert of industrialized states, working
through the G-7 in particular, harmonizes its economic policy in such a fashion that it
can effectively use these multilateral forums
to promote its neoliberal agenda.
We do not mean to suggest that the
current multilateral arrangements and initiatives
are set in stone. However, it is unlikely
that the instrument will be jettisoned,
if only because of the deep commitment
on the part of the concert to maintain
it. Moreover, multilateral institutions in the
North are being strengthened as the states
from Eastern Europe seek membership in
the European Union and NATO. The deepening
and broadening of multilateral institutions
in the North have had the added effect
of reinforcing the divide between those in
the concert and those outside. In short, multilateralism
has not proved to be antithetical
to unipolarity. In fact, the two have worked
in tandem to promote the interests of the
North in both the economic and security
spheres.
North v. South: Economics
The self-serving nature of the North's claims
about the advantages of unfettered globalization
and the integration of the world
economy on terms determined by the industrialized
countries is obvious in the economic
arena. Bringing down barriers imposed by
state boundaries allows the economically
powerful states to penetrate weak and vulnerable
societies, especially those without
adequate regulatory mechanisms and with
unrepresentative regimes, many of which are
dependent upon the major powers for their
security. Moreover, the majority of economic
interactions that make for interdependence
in a "globalizing" world take place within
the triad of North America, Europe, and
Japan. As the globalization scholars Paul
Hirst and Grahame Thompson have pointed
out, "Capital mobility is not producing a
massive shift of investment and employment
from the advanced to the developing countries.
Rather foreign direct investment (FDI)
is highly concentrated among the advanced
industrial economies and the Third World
remains marginal in both investment and
trade, a small minority of newly industrializing
countries apart."21 According to
William Drozdiak, president of the American
Council on Germany, "Over the past
eight years, Americans invested twice as
much in the Netherlands as in Mexico and
ten times as much as in China.... Conversely,
Europe provides 75 percent of all investment
in the United States....22
The disproportionate benefits of globalization
that go to the developed states are
not limited to FDI flows. This argument
may also be extended to the protection of
intellectual property and patents, to the access the North enjoys to the markets and cheap labor of the Third World, to the hundreds of billions of dollars spent by the North in farm export subsidies, to the imposition of trade barriers.
The skewed nature of globalization is
demonstrated above all by the fact that
while much is made of the need for the unfettered
mobility of goods and capital globally,
no voices are raised in the North in favor
of the free movement of labor across the
globe. Even Turkey's prospective but contested
membership in the EU has been
made contingent on Ankara accepting severe
limits on the migration of Turks to Europe,
in contrast to the unregulated movement
among the citizens of the current EU member
states.23 The logic of economic globalization
enhances the interests of the powerful
against the weak, of the rich against the
poor, but rarely vice versa. Furthermore,
these rules are becoming embedded in an
increasingly institutionalized and legalized
multilateral order that makes it difficult to
bring about radical transformations in the
near future.
North v. South: Politics and Security
In the political arena, tearing down the sovereignty
barrier in the name of humanitarian
intervention serves much the same purpose
of preserving the dominance of the
North. Such interventions undertaken selectively to punish "rogue" states, such as Iraq
and Yugoslavia, send the message that opposing
the international establishment is
likely to incur heavy costs. The selectivity
with which the normative injunctions of the
emerging global society are applied makes
this very clear. Interventions take place
when it suits the strategic and economic interests of the "coalition of the willing and the able" (read the Concert of the North Atlantic).
Where it does not suit the dominant
concert, the evolving norms of supposedly
global society are disregarded. The cases of
Rwanda and Sudan illustrate this outlook.24
The selectivity leads to two important
conclusions. First, sovereignty continues to
be a cherished value so far as powerful states
and their clients are concerned. Advising
the weak to dispense with sovereignty and
with their preoccupation with state security
and relative gains is one thing, applying it
to powerful states and their coalitions is
quite another. As Dartmouth professors
Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno
have pointed out, the argument that sovereignty
has been superseded as the organizing
principle of international political life
cannot be successfully sustained unless it
is demonstrated "by reference to 'critical'
cases.... The clearest set of critical cases
would involve instances in which the exertion
of some form of international authority
significantly constrained major powers in
their pursuit of their interests.... If we look
at the present processes of international decision
making [the veto power of the permanent
members of the U.N. Security Council
and the G-7's domination of international
financial institutions], however, the prospect
of finding such critical cases appears to be
unlikely."25
Second, the rhetoric of globalization and
the global society is employed to provide a
facade for dominion of the North over the
states of the South. James Richardson has
captured this reality very lucidly: "Self interest
now appears to dictate that the leading
powers remain associates rather than rivals,
as balance of power logic would have
required, but the anarchic system structure
points to their retaining a military capability
to protect their favored position against
the less favored."26
The retention of vastly superior military
capability is currently achieved through
what has come to be known as the revolution
in military affairs (RMA) or the military
technological revolution, which the security
expert Eliot Cohen has summed up thus:
"What can be seen by high-tech sensors can
be hit, what can be hit will be destroyed."27
The hierarchy of military power has seldom
been as rigidly stratified as it has become
today as a result of RMA. The United States
sits in lonely glory at the top of the technological-
military pyramid.28 The advanced industrialized
countries plus Israel are clustered
two-thirds of the way up, with China
and India somewhat lower down. All the
rest form the base of the pyramid, and from
their perspective, the view is frightening.
The extreme disparity in military power
and its political consequences have been emphasized
over and over again since 1990. It
was made explicit during the first Gulf war
and, with increasingly greater clarity, during
the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 and
the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan
in 2001°02. It was dramatically driven
home by the American campaign of
"shock and awe" conducted against Iraq in
March-April 2003. What impressed much
of the South with regard to these military
ventures was not the righteousness of the
causes espoused by the dominant concert or
the unipolar power acting on its behalf.
What overawed countries of the South was
the enormous destructive power the coalition,
and especially the United States, was
able to bring to bear on its enemies from
long distances, thereby making itself immune
to retaliation. The precision and impunity
with which the U.S.-led concert was
able to destroy the vital military nerve centers
of Iraq and Yugoslavia, rendering them
incapable of defending themselves, was perceived
as a technological miracle that
dwarfed even the nuclear weapons revolution
in terms of its actual impact on military
affairs.
The revolution in military affairs and
the use of precision weaponry by the
United States and its allies has left an indelible
mark on the psyche of the Third
World political elites. One the one hand, it
has increased their feeling of insecurity. On
the other, those among Third World elites
who continue to harbor a defiant streak or
perceive their countries to be in danger of
being labeled "rogue" states have been
spurred to find "equalizers" that may deter
powerful states from initiating military action
against them. This means either obtaining
weapons of mass destruction, however
rudimentary, along with long-range delivery
systems (nuclear, chemical, biological
warheads, plus missiles) or employing "terror"
tactics that make the use of advanced
weaponry politically unacceptable. Thus,
the highly asymmetrical distribution of conventional
military capabilities, a product of
the military-technological revolution, has
brought about an equally asymmetrical
response.
The attempt to attain weapons of mass
destruction and missile capability by "states
of concern," including North Korea and
Iran, as well as terrorist attacks on soft
targets in the United States and elsewhere
in the North, should be seen at least in
part as a response to the acquisition and
use of precision weaponry by the United
States and its allies. For those in the South
bent on defying the dominant concert of
powers, and especially the unipolar power,
weapons of mass destruction and terrorist
tactics seem to be the only equalizers
against the precision-guided conventional
weaponry that can be unleashed by the
United States and the concert it leads. This
adds to their attraction for those who are
unwilling to embrace the new world order,
with its military, economic, and normative
corollaries, that the dominant concert is intent
upon imposing on the international
system.
An Elaborate Pretense
The fevered debate over the question of
unipolarity and American hegemony is a
smokescreen that obscures the fact that
there is a group of powerful nations with a
shared outlook and goals. Disagreements do
arise among the members of what we have
called the Concert of the North Atlantic,
but they are over strategy and tactics, not
objectives. The United States, as all leaders
do, sometimes moves so far ahead of the
other members that it makes the rest of the
pack very uncomfortable. It is in this context
that arguments about the value of institutions
that bind the hegemon are made.29
However, as the Kissinger and Summers report
makes plain, "disagreements on policy,
not differences over the utility of international
institutions, have caused most of
these [recent] clashes" in the transatlantic
relationship.30 The European insistence that
the United States give more attention to
multilateralism is a plea for consultation
among members of the concert, not an argument
to strengthen institutions of global
governance where the less powerful would
have a major voice. This is a distinction that
must clearly be borne in mind by analysts
engaged in debating the merits of multilateralism
versus unilateralism. For those outside
the concert, multilateralism and unilateralism
often appear as variations on the
same theme of uninvited intervention.
The institutional constraint argument is
made largely to draw the leader back in to
the pack rather than make it accountable.
Those outside the pack continue to remain
marginal actors in the international arena,
if not mere spectators. Eventually, compromises
are reached that restore the unity of
the pack without embarrassing the leader
too much. This is clearly demonstrated by
what has been happening in the wake of the
war against Iraq. The fact that these maneuverings
have not been completely successful is due in large part to the all-pervasive insecurity
in Iraq as a result of the resistance
by insurgent forces there. It is reasonable
to assume that minus the insurgency, the
United States and France and Germany
would have reconciled their differences
sooner and would be working together in
Iraq through multilateral mechanisms.
In our view, the discussion about unipolarity
versus bipolarity and multipolarity, or
about the relevance or irrelevance of unipolarity
to the age of globalization is marginal
to the major problem facing international
society. The major impasse facing international
society today is the huge disparity in
power between the Concert of the North
Atlantic and most of the rest of the members
of the international system. This disparity
and the cavalier use of power by
the dominant concertnot just by the
United Statesagainst selected targets have
created a situation that threatens the already
fragile normative consensus underpinning
international society. The unilateral actions
on the part of the United States, as in Iraq,
threaten not so much the integrity of the
concert as they do the foundational norms of
international society, such as sovereignty
and nonintervention. If this trend continues,
we may end up with a hyperrealist world in
which "the strong do what they can and the
weak suffer what they must." This backsliding
toward anarchy, despite the solidarists'
naive claims to the contrary, is a prelude to
a serious breakdown of order in the international
system.31
We see signs of this impending anarchy
in unilateral military actions in defiance of
international consensus and in doctrines justifying
preventative, and not merely preemptive,
war. We see it in escalating international
terrorism and what appears to
many as an approaching "clash of civilizations"
between the "Judeo-Christian"
North/West and the Muslim world. We see
it also in the attraction that weapons of
mass destruction hold for the weak, as suggested
by the evidence linking the Pakistani
nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan to the dissemination
of nuclear know-how. Notwithstanding
the Libyan decision to renounce
weapons of mass destruction and Iran's increased,
although hesitant, cooperation with
the International Atomic Energy Agency,
the incentive to proliferate has increased
during the past decade. North Korea's recent
public admission that it possesses nuclear
weapons may be a harbinger.32 This
may very well be the case because acquisition
of such weapons appears to the weak to
be their most effective defense against the
advanced weaponry of the powerful. Efforts
to acquire weapons of mass destruction as
well as the spread of international terrorism
demonstrate that the imposition of order,
when it is not tempered with justice, creates
a backlash. This is a lesson that the capitals
of the major powers can overlook only at
their own peril.
*Mohammed Ayoob is University Distinguished Professor of International Relations
and Matthew Zierler is a visiting assistant professor of international
relation at James Madison College, Michigan State University.
Notes:
1. Richard Bernstein, "Many in Europe See U.S.
Vote as a Lose-Lose Affair," New York Times, October
29, 2004.
2. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success
in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004),
p. 20. This counters Robert Kagan's argument that
"on major strategic and international questions
today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are
from Venus" (Of Paradise and Power: America and
Europe in the New World Order [New York: Knopf,
2003], p. 3).
3. Stephen R. Weisman, "Rice Calls on Europe
to Join in Building a Safer World," New York Times,
February 9, 2005.
4. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The
Third World against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
5. For an analysis that juxtaposes the collective
aspirations of Third World states and their individual
vulnerabilities, thus elucidating the apparently
schizophrenic tendencies they demonstrate, see Mohammed
Ayoob, "The Third World in the System of
States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?" International
Studies Quarterly, vol. 33 (March 1989),
pp. 67°79.
6. Henry A. Kissinger and Lawrence H. Summers,
Renewing the Atlantic Partnership: Report of an Independent
Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign
Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations,
2004), p. 7.
7. For the view that the Cold War heralded a
systemic transformation, see Samuel P. Huntington,
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); and
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last
Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).
8. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Understanding International
Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 5th ed.
(New York: Longman, 2004), p. 37 (emphases in
original).
9. For the case that America's current global
predominance constitutes unipolarity, see Stephen G.
Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "American Primacy
in Perspective," Foreign Affairs, vol. 81
(July/August 2002), pp. 20°33.
10. This is what Hedley Bull aptly termed
"the revolt against the West" that went beyond
issues of politics and economics to the norms and
rules governing international society. See "The
Revolt Against the West," in The Expansion of
International Society, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam
Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984),
pp. 217°28.
11. Krasner, Sructural Conflict; and Robert A.
Mortimer, The Third World Coalition in International
Politics, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986).
12. For the classic explanation of neoliberalism,
see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
13. James L. Richardson, Contending Liberalisms
in World Politics: Ideology and Power (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp. 89°90.
14. Graham Allison, "The Impact of Globalization
on National and International Security," in Governance
in a Globalizing World, ed. Joseph S. Nye and
John D. Donahue (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 72.
15. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, p. 184.
16. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002).
17. Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
18. See Dani Rodrik, The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness Work (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council,
1999).
19. Sean Kay, "Globalization, Power, and Security,"
Security Dialogue, vol. 35, no. 1 (2004), p. 11.
20. See, for example, Charles Kupchan, The End
of the American Era (New York: Knopf, 2002); and
Kagan, Of Paradise and Power.
21. Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization
in Question, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity,
1999), p. 2.
22. William Drozdiak, "The North Atlantic
Drift," Foreign Affairs, vol. 84 (January/February
2005), p. 89.
23. Elaine Sciolino, "Turkey Advances in Its Bid
to Join European Union," New York Times, October 7,
2004.
24. See Mohammed Ayoob, "Humanitarian
Intervention and State Sovereignty," International
Journal of Human Rights, vol. 6 (spring 2002),
pp. 81°102.
25. Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno,
"Introduction: International Intervention, State Sovereignty,
and the Future of International Society," in
Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International
Intervention, ed. Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1995), p. 17.
26. James L. Richardson, "The End of Geopolitics?"
in Charting the Post°Cold War Order, ed.
Richard Leaver and James L. Richardson (Boulder,
CO: Westview, 1993), pp. 45°46.
27. Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare,"
Foreign Affairs, vol. 75 (March/April 1996), p. 45;
see also, Lawrence Freedman, "Revolutions in Military
Affairs," in The Future of War, ed. Gwyn Prins
and Hylke Tromp (Boston: Kluwer Law International,
2000).
28. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and William A. Owens,
"America's Information Edge," Foreign Affairs, vol.
75 (March/April 1996), pp. 20°36.
29. See G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions,
Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after
Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2001).
30. Kissinger and Summers, Renewing the Atlantic
Partnership, p. 20.
31. For discussions of the notion of international
society in an anarchical international system, see
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order
in World Politics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1977); and Robert Jackson, The Global
Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2000). For a sophisticated
solidaristic conception of international society,
see Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian
Intervention in International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
32. James Brooke, "North Korea Says It Has
Nuclear Weapons and Rejects Talks," New York
Times, February 10, 2005.
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