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UPDATES: January 11, 2005
Dear Friends,
It is always nice to see a solid piece of writing that takes the reader deeper into an important issue. It is even better when that article is published on the Opinion page of a prestigious newspaper like The New York Times. When the author is someone you know and respect, well- frankly it seems almost too good to be true.
But, when there are two articles by two respected analysts in one day, well... Then you think, this should be the rule and not the exception. Every day, the New York Times should be publishing the likes of Lawrence Korb and Cindy Williams.
Lawrence J. Korb, is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, was assistant secretary of defense from 1981 to 1985. Check out more of his work online at www.AmericanProgress.org
Cindy Williams, a principal research scientist in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is the editor of "Filling the Ranks: Transforming the U.S. Military Personnel System." And no, she was not the actress who played Shirley on "Laverne and Shirley."
Today, Korb and Williams are writing on the proposed cuts to the Pentagon budget for 2006, and why they don't quite add up to real reform. The proposed cuts, they say, are not in the right places, not for the right reasons, and are not enough to address the waste, fraud and irresponsibility of the bloated military industrial complex.
Below, are both articles for your edification.
January 11, 2005
The New York Times, Opinion Page
The Pentagon's New Math
By LAWRENCE J. KORB
BECAUSE of the cost of the war in Iraq and the mounting federal deficit, the Office of Management and Budget has ordered the Pentagon to make major budget cuts over the next six years. According to the Pentagon, these could come to more than $55 billion and will affect almost all major weapons programs. Like most reports about reductions in Pentagon spending, however, there is less to it than meets the eye.
First, the overall size of the Pentagon budget would not come down very much. A large amount of the money that is supposedly being cut is in fact only being transferred from the Air Force and Navy budgets to the Army's, which is scheduled to increase by $5 billion a year. The overall military budget will continue to rise; from 2006 through 2011, the Pentagon will still spend more than $2.5 trillion, not counting the costs of the war in Iraq, which now exceed $200 billion.
Second, the proposed savings will take some time to translate into actual budget reductions. For example, in its 2006 budget, which will be sent to the Congress next month, the Pentagon plans to cut budget authority - which includes spending, borrowing and contractual obligations - by $5.9 billion. But because so much of that money was scheduled to be spent toward the end of the decade, the actual reduction in 2006 alone will be only about $1 billion. Most of the money that will be spent on new weapons next year has already been authorized by Congress.
Third, many of the reductions are not real cuts. For example, the Navy still plans to buy 30 Virginia-class nuclear submarines for some $60 billion, but rather than buying two a year for the next six years, as had been planned, the Pentagon will buy only one per year. This will "save" about $5.3 billion in the next six years, but simply pushes the cost to the following years.
The Pentagon is also slowing down the number of V-22 Osprey aircraft it will buy each year. This may save some money in total, but will push the eventual cost of this plane to more than $100 million each. Similarly, the national missile defense system will be restructured to save $5 billion over the next six years, but the total cost of the system remains unchanged. And the Pentagon proposes to add money to some programs: the Air Force's space-based radar program, for example, would receive an extra $600 million.
Fourth, many of the proposed reductions will lead to the taxpayer getting less bang for the buck. Take, for example, the F/A-22 Raptor fighter jet. In 1985, the Air Force claimed that it could buy 750 of the planes for $35 million each. The Pentagon now plans to halt production in 2008, by which time it will have purchased about 180 planes, at a total cost of about $60 billion. In other words, each Raptor will cost more than $300 million, more than eight times the original estimate. (For this same $60 billion, the Air Force could have purchased about 1,000 of the more traditional F-16 fighters, which are equally as capable of meeting military needs in the post-cold-war world.)
Fifth, many of these proposed reductions are unlikely to take place. Under the plan, the Air Force will continue to purchase Raptors through the end of the second Bush administration. Will the next president support the decision to close the production line and put more than 2,000 people out of work in Georgia, whose two Republican senators are already on record as opposing the cancellation? Likewise, will Congress support the Pentagon's decision to cancel the LPD-17, a Marine amphibious ship, in 2008?
History says it won't. The Clinton administration, for example, did not stop production of the Seawolf submarine or the Osprey aircraft, which had been proposed by the departing administration of President George H. W. Bush.
Are there any alternatives to this shell game? If the Pentagon were serious about spending, it could take several concrete steps now: canceling cold-war-era weapons systems like the F/A-22 fighter; dropping all contracts that involve money appropriated by Congress but which has not yet been spent; halting the deployment of the national missile defense system until it has been adequately tested; and terminating the much-criticized new contract to lease 100 refueling planes from Boeing.
We are facing a real budget crisis - one brought on by the unwise decision to cut taxes in the midst of a war. Unfortunately, the steps that the Pentagon now proposes will not do much to deal with that crisis, either in the short or the long term.
January 11, 2005
The New York Times, Opinion Page
Making the Cuts, Keeping the Benefits
By CINDY WILLIAMS
IN an effort to reduce the growth of the military budget, the Bush administration is poised to cut back a wide array of Pentagon programs, from jet fighters to a missile defense system. Pentagon leaders say the cuts will save more than $55 billion over six years.
Whether these reductions herald the end of the rapid rise in military spending that began in 1999, however, is open to question. While fewer weapons systems than planned will be purchased during the next six years, in financial terms, putting an end to the buildup will require cutting far more than what is now on the chopping block. One reason is that much of the recent rise in spending has been fueled not by new tanks or missiles, but by new costs associated with military personnel - especially retirees. These costs amount to a permanent increase in the military budget. Unlike spending on equipment, they cannot be canceled or deferred.
Since the start of the buildup, the rising costs of military pay, retiree benefits, health care and family housing have greatly outstripped inflation and added more than $40 billion to annual Pentagon budgets, even though the number of active-duty troops has essentially stayed the same. Moreover, the annual costs continue to grow rapidly. The program reductions that are reported to be under consideration would not be enough to offset the growth in spending for military pay and benefits anticipated during the next several years. Even holding the increases in the military budget to the level of inflation would require tens of billions of dollars in annual reductions.
To the extent that added pay and benefits ensure the nation does right by the men and women who fight for it, these increases would seem worthwhile. Unfortunately, a large share of new spending is devoted not to helping soldiers serving today, but to improving the benefits for military retirees - that is, the small minority of veterans who stay in the military for 20 years or more and are eligible for immediate benefits upon their retirements.
In recent years, Congress has expanded retiree benefits substantially, making them the fastest-growing category of entitlements for military personnel. In 1999, Congress reversed a 1986 law that would have trimmed pensions for retirees who joined the military after 1986. That change costs the Defense Department some $1 billion annually. A health care entitlement granted by Congress in 2000 pays virtually all medical expenses for older retirees and their spouses - including the cost of prescription drugs - that are not covered by Medicare. That entitlement costs the Defense Department nearly $4 billion now and its costs will rise over the coming years.
Another benefit, granted by Congress last year and scheduled to be phased in over a decade, will permit retirees who depart the military with moderate to severe disabilities to collect retirement pensions in addition to their disability payments. Its cost, about $500 million this year, will rise to some $2.5 billion a year in six years. In addition, a change authorized in October 2004 will enrich the pensions of spouses who outlive retired service members, at a cost of about $200 million this year and nearly $1 billion in 2011. As expensive as these new benefits are, advocates are pressing Congress for more.
These deferred entitlements do nothing to help men and women now in uniform. These members of the military face long and frequent family separations, deployment to distant lands, fighting in a dangerous counter-insurgency and more. Cash bonuses, improved family services, modern and well-maintained equipment and increases in troop strength (which would mean less frequent call-ups and deployments) are far more likely to serve their needs.
In fact, most active-duty military will never get anything - because they will leave the service before they are eligible to retire with benefits. Fewer than one in 12 of today's living veterans qualify for retiree benefits, and fewer than one in five of today's active-duty service members are expected to stay for the 20 years it takes to receive them.
Moreover, deferred benefits will not help the Army or the National Guard overcome the recruitment and retention problems they face as a result of the war in Iraq. The prospect of receiving such benefits in the distant future is virtually worthless in helping the military to persuade an 18-year-old to join the military or encourage a 23-year-old to re-enlist.
The rapid growth of retiree benefits has already greatly complicated the budget picture for military leaders. Even if Congress decides against further expansion of such benefits, the ones it has already granted will make it hard to slow budget growth without further reducing the size of the military. Giving in to pressure for another round of entitlements, in the face of the challenges facing the troops serving in Iraq and elsewhere, would be irresponsible.
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