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TRADE RESOURCE CENTER
CURRENT UPDATES:
September 25, 2006
Dear Friends,
Turns out that the war in Iraq,
rather than stemming the growth of terrorism, has helped fuel its
spread across the globe, according to a classified intelligence
assessment bringing together the work of the sixteen different agencies.
This little bit of news was revealed by Mark Mazetti in the September
24th issue of the New York Times ("Spy Agencies Say Iraq War
Worsens Terror Threat").
In this edition of the Arms
Trade Resource Center E-Update, we look at war plans for Iran and
the legacy of cluster weapons in Lebanon.
Best,
Frida Berrigan
Bill Hartung
I. IRAN: WAR OR RUMORS OF
WAR?
"We have about seven weeks
to try and stop this next war from happening."
**Ray McGovern, former CIA official to peace activists in Washington,
DC on September 17, 2006.
"We're working toward a
diplomatic solution to this crisis, and as we
do, we look to the day when you can live in freedom, and America
and
Iran can be good friends and close partners in the cause of peace."
**President Bush to the "people of Iran" while speaking
at the UN
General Assembly, September 19, 2006.
"We are opposed to the
development of nuclear weapons. We think it is
of no use and that it is against the interests of nations."
**President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Time Magazine reporter, Scott
MacLeod, published September 25, 2006.
Some analysts are alarmed at
the bustle around Navy stations right now.
In an article titled "What Would War Look Like?" Time
Magazine reveals
that the Navy has issued "Prepare to Deploy Orders" (PTDOs)
to a strike
group including a submarine, an Aegis class cruiser, mine sweepers
and
a mine hunter. Despite laying out a detailed scenario for "what
would
war look like" with Iran, Time opens its piece with a giant
caveat:
"No one knows whether -
let alone when - a military confrontation with
Iran will come to pass. The fact that admirals are reviewing plans
for
blockades is hardly proof of their intentions. The U.S. military
routinely makes plans for scores of scenarios, the vast majority
of which
will never be put into practice."
Sam Gardiner, a retired Air
Force Colonel, is perhaps the most
pessimistic analyst of all regarding the prospects of a U.S. attack
on Iran.
He argues that the PTDO "is a very significant order and it
is not done
as an exercise." Taken alongside disclosures that the Chief
of Naval
Operations asked his planners for a rundown of how a blockade of
Iranian
oil ports would work, this revelation led Time to cautiously conclude
that the U.S. "may be preparing for war with Iran."
On the political side, we are
listening to increasingly hot rhetoric
coming from Washington. On Tim Russert last week, Vice President
Dick
Cheney was asked "Will we do anything to stop the Iranians
from having a
nuclear bomb?" While paying lip service to diplomacy, Cheney
emphasized
that "we think they should not have a nuclear bomb* the President
has
always emphasized no options have been taken off the table."
Even in the midst of what was
suppose to be a "warm and fuzzy" speech
at the United Nations, President Bush leveled some barbed criticism
at
Iran, saying: Tehran continues to "fund terrorism, and fuel
extremism,
and pursue nuclear weapons* Iran must abandon its nuclear weapons
ambitions."
The only question is: what might
push this combative rhetoric over the
edge towards war? Iran's purported interest in nuclear weapons and
its
insistence on the right to enrich uranium have been portrayed is
if
they are one and the same thing* And members of the administration
have
cited other arguments in what looks like a propaganda campaign to
justify
acts of war against Iran, including Teheran's hostility to Israel,
its
support for terrorism, and its alleged desire to control some of
the
world's richest oil regions.
WAR IS ABSURD: The "Making
Sense" Filter Clogged
"The notion of a war with
Iran seems absurd," concludes the Time
article. "By any rational measure, the last thing the United
States can
afford is another war." But as Sam Gardiner comments wryly
in his report
for the Century Foundation, "The End of the 'Summer of Diplomacy:'
Assessing U.S. Military Options in Iran," the "making
sense" filter was not
applied over the past four years in Iraq and is unlikely to be applied
in evaluating whether to attack Iran.
Gardiner puts forward a hypothetical
view of the "seven truths" about
Iran shared by members of the Bush administration. Of these
propositions, Gardiner sees two as true in the real world : 1) that
Iran is
pursuing nuclear weapons; and 2) that sanctions aimed at stopping
them will be
ineffective. He also believes that Bush policymakers accept two
unlikely propositions: 1) that the Iranian people support "regime
change"; and
2) that Iran cannot be negotiated with. He further notes that U.S.
and
Israeli commandos have been exploring targets in Iran for some time.
He
argues that this combination of U.S. beliefs and real world actions
will lead to U.S. air strikes against Iran, and even the possibility
of a
campaign for regime change.
Running counter to Gardiner's
worst case scenario are the substantial
difficulties involved in bombing Iran. According to estimates quoted
in
Time, there are 1,500 different "aim points" (or viable
targets) in
Iran related to their nuclear development complex. Air strikes would
require almost everything the Air Force has, and even then, a White
House
official admits "we don't know where it all is* so we can't
get it all."
Gardiner and most other analysts
assume that air strikes would bring
Iranian retaliation, from stepped up support for Hezbollah, to a
greater
role in fostering attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq, to efforts to
block
the straits of Hormuz, a main outlet for Persian Gulf oil. Another
possibility that is less likely but not out of the question would
be Iranian
attacks on the oil pipelines of other major suppliers such as Iraq
and
Saudi Arabia, which would send world oil prices through the roof
and
make Iran's reserves worth all that much more
In light of these potential
counter moves, Anthony Zinni, former
Commander of U.S. troops in the Middle East, warns: "You've
got to be
prepared for the worst case, and the worst case in Iran is [U.S]
boots on the
ground."
Given all of this, couldn't
we live with the Iranian bomb? We got used
to nuclear armed India and Pakistan, and Israel's nuclear weapons
are
one of the world's worst kept secrets. What is so different about
Iran
heading down the same path? For U.S. policy makers a big part of
the
problem is that it would make it harder for the United States to
assert
its interests in the region, and that an Iranian bomb might provoke
Saudi
Arabia and Egypt to follow suit.
But as Bill Berkeley notes in
a well-argued piece in the Columbia
Journalism Review, neither the Bush administration rhetoric comparing
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Hitler nor his tirades
about wiping
Israel off the map can be taken at face value: "For all the
recent
rhetoric about wiping Israel off the map, which is hardly new, the
Iranians
are not Nazis. For one thing, Iran is not the dominant military
power
in the region, Israel is. Iran can harass Israel through its proxies
. .
. but it lacks the military capacity to attack Israel itself. Moreover,
Iran lacks a rational motive for doing so, since Israel would surely
respond to such an attack with massive force that could jeopardize
the
Iranian regime's survival in power." With an estimated 100
to 200
nuclear weapons in Israel's arsenal, would an Iranian bomb change
this
calculation? And to the extent that it could shift the military
balance in
the region, shouldn't the Bush administration finally break down
and
engage in open and direct talks with Tehran?
Could it be that the administration
bluffing as a way of demonstrating
their "hard nosed" diplomatic resolve? There is significant
evidence
for this alternative, starting from the fact that the U.S. military
does
not believe that air strikes on Iran are either workable or advisable,
and, as noted above, that an attack would not be likely to hit all
major Iranian nuclear sites, since U.S. intelligence doesn't know
where
they are.
Fred Kaplan, writing in Slate,
argues that there may be two tracks -
one involving force as a form of pressure and one involving plans
for an
actual military attack - moving on parallel tracks. He sums up the
current situation as follows: "Bush and Ahmadinejad, who share
a boastful
confidence in their sense of destiny, seem on a collision course
in the
logic of highway chicken - the game where two drivers speed their
cars
toward each other, head-on, on a road late at night. The winner
is the
one who doesn't veer off the road. If both drivers get nervous and
veer
off, it's a tie. If they both keep driving straight on, pedal to
the
metal, certain of victory, opposed on moral principle to backing
down,
the outcome is mutual catastrophe. And in this case, we're all sitting
in
those cars."
The flaw in Kaplan's metaphor
is that it implies two equal adversaries.
Even with a nuclear weapon, Iran would be far from being able to
inflict the kind of damage on the U.S. that Washington could inflict
on it.
And as in Iraq, the car that "veers off the road" can
come back to fight
another day, through other means.
Resources:
The End of the 'Summer of Diplomacy:'
Assessing U.S. Military Options
in Iran," Century Foundation, Sam Gardiner,
http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/gardiner_summer_diplomacy.pdf
Mind Games: Are We Going to
Attack Iran? Fred Kaplan, Slate.Com, September 18, 2006
http://www.slate.com/id/2149889/
Iran War, Diplomacy on Parallel
Tracks Jim Lobe, InterPress Service, September 21, 2006
http://www.antiwar.com/lobe/?articleid=9725
Iran: Know Thine Enemy, Bill
Berkeley, Colombia Journalism Review, September 14, 2006
http://www.alternet.org/story/41537/
II. CLUSTER BOMBS IN LEBANON
Being the world's sole superpower,
largest weapons supplier, and
biggest foreign humanitarian donor is no cake-walk. One day you
are selling
cluster bombs to Israel. Another day you're doling out aid to help
Lebanon clean up cluster bombs that did not detonate. What happened
on the
days in between? Your cluster bomb customer used up most of his
supply
shelling Lebanon.
The United States has put together
a package of post-war aid for
Lebanon totaling $230 million-including a $420,000 grant for the
Mine
Advisory Group so they can "quickly expand" their landmine
and unexploded
ordinance humanitarian clearing program to "help remove the
newest
explosive remnants of war"-most of which came from the United
States.
An Israeli military spokesman
insists that "all of the weapons and
munitions used by the IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) are legal under
international law and their use conforms to international standards."
But, the
U.S. State Department is investigating Israel's use of American-made
cluster bombs during the war in Lebanon-particularly looking at
whether
or not Israel broke a secret agreement with the United States not
to use
cluster bombs against civilians. This secret agreement seems to
have
created a loophole to the Arms Export Control Act which does not
allow
the United States to sell weapons to countries involved in aggression.
There have not been any follow
up news reports on the status of the
investigation, or its conclusions and calls to the Office of Defense
Compliance to get more information were not returned. An amendment
that
would have required the US and countries to which it sells weapons
to avoid
using cluster bombs in or near civilian areas, offered by Senators
Dianne Feinstein and Patrick Leahy on September 8th, was voted down
70/30.
Jan Egeland, The United Nations'
Under-Secretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, was decidedly
undiplomatic
in his assessment: "what is shocking and (I would say to me)
completely
immoral is that 90% of the cluster bomb strikes occurred in the
last 72
hours of the conflict, when we knew there would be a resolution."
During those three days, Israel dumped an estimated 1.2 million
bomblets
throughout Lebanon- a country smaller than Connecticut. These bombs
have a
failure rate of up to 30%, which means that one of every three bombs
may not immediately detonate- lying in wait for children, trucks,
livestock and just about whoever or whatever else might set it off.
The peace agreements were all
signed by August 14th, but the cluster
bombs have kept on killing. According to the UN Mine Action Coordination
Center, since the war ended unexploded ordinance (or UXOs in the
lingo)
have killed 12 and wounded 39-two of the dead and 11 of the wounded
have been children.
The Seattle Times talked to
one shepherd injured by a cluster bomb.
"Lying in the intensive care unit of a hospital in Tyre with
a broken and
burned leg, 22-year-old shepherd Mohammed Hassan was recovering
from
stepping on a bomblet." He told the Seattle Times, "'All
I remember is
being catapulted several meters into the air,' he said. The bomblet
was
near a path between his family's farm and the chicken house where
he had
gone to fetch eggs. 'Just before fainting, I felt down to my leg
and
thought, Thank God, it's still there.' His other foot was also injured,
as were both of his hands."
At least two of cluster weapons
and launch systems used by Israel are
made by U.S. companies. Human Rights Watch discovered remnants of
the
"M483A1" 155mm artillery projectiles which have 88 U.S.
manufactured M42
and M46 sub-munitions. They also found evidence of the Multiple
Launch
Rocket System, manufactured by Lockheed Martin and equipped with
M26
rockets. Each MLRS can fire up to 12 rockets at once, and each rocket
contains 644 M77 submunitions.
A few of the U.S. manufacturers
of cluster weapons and their products
are described below.
Aerojet
SADARM 155mm DPICM (sense and destroy armor): a 155 mm artillery
projectile can deliver two submunitions, while one of the MLRS rockets
can
deliver six. The munition can also be fired from aircraft.
Raytheon
JSOW (Joint Standoff Weapon): a precision-guided weapon developed
by
the US and its allies carrying submunitions or bomblets. The guidance
system allows the pilot to launch the weapon from a safe distance.
Textron
Sensor Fuzed Weapon (CBU 97/B): an air-launched anti-armor weapon
system. Each dispenser contains 10 BLU-108/B submunitions. Each
submunition
carries 4 SKEET anti-armor warheads.
Wide Area Munitions (WAM) can
be placed by hand, by ground vehicles,
rocket, or aircraft. "WAM, designated XM93, is a derivative
of the Skeet
submunition that is used in the BLU-108/B submunition...it can be
dispensed quickly above ground over a wide area."
Companies are making and trying
to market new cluster weapons all the
time. In vivid military jargon, Textron's promotional flier describes
the CLAW-Clean Lightweight Area Weapon, which they describe as "the
next
generation smart soft target munition." For those not familiar
with the
jargon, a soft target is a person. Textron boats that a "single
64
pound munition has the footprint and effectiveness of a 1,000lb
legacy
cluster bomb."
According to Human Rights Watch,
other manufacturers of cluster weapons
and components include: General Dynamics, L-3 Communications, Lockheed
Martin and Northrop Grumman.
RESOURCES:
Human Rights Watch, Overview of the Dirty Dozen Cluster Munitions
http://hrw.org/arms/pdfs/munitionChart0806.pdf
"Time to Take Stock: The
U.S. Cluster Munitions Inventory and the FY 2006 Department of Defense
Budget," Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, July 2005.
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/cluster0705/
Cluster Munition Coalition
http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/
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