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CURRENT
UPDATES: July 17, 2000
Nuclear Missile
Deception:
Corruption and Conflicts of Interest in the National Missile Defense
(NMD) Test Program
A Special Issue
Brief
by William D. Hartung and Michelle Ciarrocca
I. Fraud and
Incompetence in Missile Defense Programs
"It's not
a defense of the United States . . . It's a conspiracy to allow
them to milk the government. They are creating jobs for themselves
for life." Former TRW Engineer Nira Schwartz, quoted by William
Broad, New York Times, March 7, 2000
"We rigged
the test," the scientist said. "We put a beacon with a certain frequency
on the target vehicle. On the interceptor, we had a receiver." In
effect the scientist said, the target was talking to the missile,
saying, "Here I am, come get me . . . The hit looked beautiful,
so Congress didn't ask any questions." Scientist involved in
the Pentagon's June 1984 missile defense test, quoted by Tim Weiner,
New York Times, August 18, 1993
The spectacular
failure of the Pentagon’s latest National Missile Defense (NMD)
test on July 8th dramatically underscores the fact that this deeply
flawed program is simply not up to the task of defending the United
States from even a small number of ballistic missiles armed with
nuclear warheads. The NMD project has now failed two of its first
three "hit-to-kill" tests, in which an interceptor vehicle is supposed
to destroy a mock nuclear warhead in mid-flight. And even in the
one "successful" test, last October, it was later revealed that
the interceptor vehicle had originally honed in on a large, brightly
illuminated decoy balloon that in effect helped guide it to the
mock warhead. Despite this dismal track record, the Clinton administration
is still seriously considering moving towards deployment of an NMD
system by preparing to award contracts for long lead-time procurement
to begin construction on a key NMD radar system in Shemya, Alaska
in the spring of 2001.
What's the rush?
Why move full speed ahead on a system with no demonstrated capability
for actually protecting the United States against ballistic missiles?
The short answer is politics. In the short-term, the Clinton administration
is seeking to inoculate Al Gore from Republican charges of being
"soft on defense" by throwing money at the defense budget generally
and missile defense projects in particular. But now Vice President
Gore, who has tried to carve out a reputation for himself as a knowledgeable
reformer of costly and inefficient government programs and practices,
is in danger of being charged with being "soft on defense contractors"
as he stands by in silence while billions of dollars of missile
defense contracts are doled out to companies that have records of
fraud, corruption, and mismanagement. Given their recent performance,
it would be risky to buy a used car from these companies, much less
trust them to build one of the most technically demanding and costly
weapons programs ever undertaken by the Pentagon.
Fraud is nothing
new in missile defense research. But the Clinton Administration's
National Missile Defense initiative is permeated with fraud to a
degree not seen since the heyday of Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) in the 1980s. Under persistent pressure from conservative
true believers and cash hungry contractors, the Clinton/Gore NMD
plan has been an ad hoc undertaking from the start, characterized
by scientific fraud, exaggerated threat assessments and political
manipulation. Hopefully, the mounting revelations of fraud and mismanagement
in the NMD program will force Congress, the Executive Branch, and
the defense industry to stop the mad rush to deploy this dangerous
and ill-conceived system BEFORE U.S. taxpayers waste tens of billions
of dollars pursuing what John Isaacs of the Council for a Livable
World has aptly described as "a new Maginot Line."
On March 7th
of this year, in a front page article entitled "Ex-Employee Says
Contractor Faked Results of Missile Test," New York Times
science writer William Broad revealed that Nira Schwartz, a senior
research scientist at TRW, had filed suit against the company alleging
that she had been fired for refusing to falsify basic research findings
on the essential question of whether an NMD interceptor could tell
the difference between a decoy and a nuclear warhead. On May 11th,
after conducting the only independent scientific analysis to date
on test data released pursuant to Dr. Schwartz's lawsuit, Dr. Theodore
Postol of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology sent a letter
to White House Chief of Staff John Podesta presenting evidence of
"criminal fraud" in the NMD testing program.
More than two
months later, after another failed NMD test, Dr. Postol's charges
have yet to yield a serious, substantive response from the Clinton
administration. Instead, the Pentagon and the White House have countered
with political spin control, arguing that Dr. Postol would change
his mind if only he knew of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's
(BMDO) full, classified plans for addressing the decoy problem.
The Department of Defense has also engaged in a clumsy and counterproductive
effort to chill public discussion by declaring Postol's May 11th
letter itself to be classified.
At a May 25th
press briefing in Washington, DC, Postol urged the White House to
"stop playing politics with an important decision that directly
effects the security of the nation," and called for the establishment
of "a team of scientists who are truly independent in their fields
and independent of the Pentagon . . . to look into this matter."
Postol urged the Department of Defense's Inspector General to "investigate
and determine whether the BMDO classified the May 11, 2000 letter
to the White House in order to hide waste, fraud, and abuse in the
BMDO."
While the White
House has failed to act on Postol's charges, they have resonated
on Capitol Hill, where 53 House members led by Representatives Dennis
Kucinich (D-OH) and John Conyers (D-MI) have called for an FBI investigation
of potential fraud in the NMD program. Meanwhile, Senator Richard
Durbin (D-IL) has put forward an amendment that would require the
Pentagon to test the NMD system in realistic conditions against
multiple decoys before making any decisions about deployment.
Durbin's amendment
responds in part to further revelations by Postol regarding the
Pentagon's "dumbing down" of the test series for the NMD interceptor
from now through 2005. Postol persuasively demonstrates that the
BMDO redesigned the test series to purposely exclude the numbers
and types of decoys that the interceptor had been unable to tell
from the mock warhead during preliminary tests. In fact, Postol
noted, the large, balloon shaped decoy that had played a part in
the only successful NMD intercept to date acted not as a decoy but
as a "beacon" which assisted the kill vehicle in its efforts to
locate the mock warhead.
The test of July
8th was no better -- it failed despite the Pentagon's best efforts
to ensure a positive outcome. As Mark Thompson noted in the July
10th issue of Time magazine (released on July 3rd), the latest
test of the system used a similar decoy to the one that served as
a beacon in last fall's test (the decoy balloon failed to inflate
during the test). In addition, the other parameters of the test
were so carefully scripted that Thompson rightly suggested that
the experiment is all but rigged:
"There
are virtually no unknowns in the procedure. The Pentagon knows the
type of rocket launching the target as well as the nature of the
target; it knows how powerful the rocket's engine is, where it is
coming from, and when it is being launched. The crew launching the
interceptor will even get to listen in on the countdown of the warhead's
rocket as it takes place. All that is valuable intelligence -- and
much, if not all of it, would be denied to the U.S. if a rogue state
decided to strike. Such advantages 'place significant limitations'
on the value of the test, says Philip Coyle, the Pentagon's chief
weapons tester."
If the NMD system
can't even pass a test that is "all but rigged," how would it fare
in a more realistic test environment involving multiple decoys?
The extreme difficulties involved in discriminating decoys from
warheads and the inadequacy of the Pentagon's current testing regime
have been highlighted in a major joint study by scientists affiliated
with MIT and the Union of Concerned Scientists, in a statement by
the American Physical Society (the largest organization of physicists
in the U.S.), and in a recent letter by 50 American Nobel Laureates
organized by the Washington-based Federation of American Scientists
which also underscores the strategic risks of proceeding with NMD.
But, much like Richard Nixon's "secret plan" for peace in Vietnam,
the BMDO's sole response to this avalanche of informed technical
criticism has been to claim that it has classified plans for dealing
effectively with decoys that cannot be revealed at this time for
fear of tipping off potential adversaries.
The Pentagon's
continued stonewalling in the face of valid technical critiques
of NMD underscores the need for an independent assessment of the
program by scientists and organizations that do not stand to profit
by ignoring the system's glaring weaknesses. Unfortunately, the
NMD testing program as currently structured does just the opposite:
it maximizes the authority and influence of companies like Boeing,
Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon which stand to make billions of dollars
if a decision is made to go full speed ahead towards deployment.
II. Nonstop
Money Dispenser: The Corporate Role in NMD Fraud
As the debate
over whether or not to deploy the Clinton Administration's National
Missile Defense (NMD) system heats up, it's worth taking a good,
hard look at the companies responsible for building the Pentagon's
most sophisticated and demanding weapon system yet. Since Ronald
Reagan gave his March 1983 speech touting a new missile defense
program that could render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete,"
the U.S. has spent over $70 billion researching and developing the
various mutations of missile defense.
According to
the Congressional Budget Office the first two phases of the Clinton
administration's NMD system will cost taxpayers at least another
$60 billion (counting the costs of dual use communications and tracking
satellites). The Council for a Livable World has suggested that
the multi-tiered approach favored by George W. Bush could cost $120
billion or more. Even by the standards of the Pentagon, that's a
hell of a lot of money.
For the four
"lumbering behemoths of the apocalypse" -- the military mega-firms
Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, and TRW, which despite splitting
over $30 billion per year in Pentagon contracts are still struggling
financially -- a lead role in the NMD program offers a glitzy new
set of projects and a major stream of potential new revenues to
lure back investors and skilled personnel who have been turned off
by the companies recent track records of corruption, cost overruns,
and mismanagement. These four companies dominate the missile defense
program at this point, accounting for 60% of total missile defense
contracts issued by the Pentagon during the last two fiscal years
-- a total of over $2.2 billion during that time period. Since the
results of the missile defense tests they are helping to carry out
will determine whether they start reaping lucrative, multi-billion
dollar NMD production contracts, these major corporate players in
the NMD testing program have serious and direct conflicts of interest.
Boeing/TRW
As noted above,
recent news reports indicate that TRW, a subcontractor for NMD,
faked tests and evaluations of a key component in the NMD system,
the "hit-to-kill" vehicle that is supposed to seek out and destroy
incoming nuclear warheads against a backdrop of chaff and decoys.
The whistle-blower, former TRW senior engineer Dr. Nira Schwartz,
served on TRW's anti-missile team in 1995 and 1996. Schwartz contends
that in test after test the interceptors failed to discriminate
decoys from warheads, but management at TRW refused to report these
failures to the Pentagon. After repeated appeals to her boss and
colleagues to alert industrial partners and the military to her
findings, Schwartz was fired.
Schwartz's allegations
revolve around the interceptor being developed for the NMD system.
In using computer programs to certify to the government that TRW's
interceptor would pick out enemy warheads from decoys, Schwartz
found that the proposed interceptor could do so only 5 to 15% of
the time rather than 95% of the time, the performance goal established
by the BMDO.
Pentagon spokesman
Kenneth Bacon has tried to wave off charges of fraud involving the
TRW "hit to kill" vehicle by arguing that a different vehicle, being
developed by Raytheon, has been chosen for inclusion in the final
NMD system. However, Bacon and his colleagues at the Pentagon have
consistently failed to mention that Boeing, which is now the Lead
Systems Integrator for the entire NMD project, designed the TRW
interceptor vehicle that has been the subject of the fraud allegations.
Indeed, Boeing proudly notes on its web site that the Boeing/TRW
interceptor is still a "hot backup" in case the Raytheon version
fails to perform adequately.
Furthermore,
as Theodore Postol pointed out in his May 25th press briefing, "BMDO
continues to make transparently false statements about the capabilities
of the Raytheon Kill Vehicle relative to the Boeing Kill Vehicle.
The Raytheon Kill Vehicle was NOT selected over the Boeing vehicle
for technical reasons, as claimed by BMDO. It was selected because
a Boeing employee illegally obtained sensitive Raytheon technical
documentation on their Kill Vehicle." Postol's charge is particularly
damning in the light of Boeing's central role in the biggest defense
contracting scandal of the 1980s, Operation Ill Wind, in which the
company and several of its key employees were at the center of a
network of contractors and Pentagon employees trading in classified
information in order to rig bids on major Pentagon weapons development
programs.
Boeing's record
of fraud and manipulation is especially troubling when one considers
how dependent the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
has become on the company for carrying out even the most basic tasks
relating to the testing program. As the Lead Systems Integrator
for the NMD program, Boeing has unprecedented authority: the company
is in charge of organizing and evaluating the entire BMD test series
and supervising the work of key prime contractors and subcontractors
involved in the research program. To cite one small recent example
of the BMDO's dependence on Boeing, the New York Times reported
on July 6th that journalists who want to view the July 7th NMD test
via satellite would have to do so at Boeing's auditorium in the
DC area because the Pentagon lacks the necessary equipment and facilities
to provide simultaneous viewing of the test.
Whether Boeing
colluded with TRW's manipulation of test results or merely overlooked
them, it doesn't bode well for its role as the principal monitoring
agent for subcontractors involved in NMD and the chief architect
of the entire NMD testing program. Indeed, the most recent report
on the NMD program by Philip Coyle, Director of the Pentagon's Independent
Office of Testing and Evaluation, found that in its role as Lead
Systems Integrator Boeing failed to establish a system for evaluating
the testing program OR supervising the myriad subcontractors involved
in NMD research and development.
For all practical
purposes the fox is guarding the chicken coop: If Boeing is able
to orchestrate a series of seemingly credible tests, it stands to
make billions of dollars in production contracts for decades to
come.
As the Project
on Government Oversight (POGO) has demonstrated in a series of recent
reports on waste and mismanagement in the defense sector, "until
contractors improve their performance record and eliminate fraud,
oversight remains crucial for protecting the public purse." POGO
cites DOD Inspector General Eleanor Hill's similar concerns: "While
we understand the many benefits of the new emphasis on Government/industry
teamwork, the Department should not assume that procurement fraud
no longer occurs. To the contrary, our criminal investigators report
that their proactive undercover efforts regularly reveal significant
fraudulent activity . . . Many advocates of drastic changes in Government
acquisition practices are unaware of, or choose to ignore, the fact
that procurement fraud remains a threat to the DOD and the U.S.
taxpayer." For example, another POGO report notes that between 1994
and 1996, the defense industry returned more than $850 million to
the government just to settle fraud cases under the False Claims
Act.
Lockheed Martin
Lockheed has
long been associated with the best and the worst of defense contracting,
from successful programs like the F-16 fighter and the SR-71 reconnaissance
plane to emblematic episodes of fraud and mismanagement like its
bailout by the U.S. government in the early 1970s, its central role
in the foreign bribery scandals in the mid-1970s, and its infamous
role as the provider of the $600 toilet seat in the 1980s. Which
Lockheed Martin will we see in the NMD program -- the world class
weapons producer or the world class purveyor of cost overruns and
contract manipulation? A few examples may help shed light on this
conundrum.
- Lockheed Martin
was in charge of the 1984 Homing Overlay Experiment (part of Reagan's
Star Wars) that was later exposed as fraudulent (see source notes
for further details).
- Lockheed Martin
agreed to pay $13 million to settle government accusations that
it violated arms export laws by sharing satellite technology with
China. The violations date back to 1994 and cover 30 charges concerning
dealings with Hong Kong-based Asia Satellite. Lockheed Martin
provided Asia Satellite Telecommunications with technology that
State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said could be used
in missile development.
- An independent
review of expensive and well-publicized launch failures of Lockheed
Martin's rockets and satellites found that the company focused
too heavily on cutting costs and not enough on supervising the
quality of its work. More than $2 billion worth of military and
private satellites were either destroyed or deployed into useless
orbits after launch from Lockheed's Titan, Centaur and Athena
rockets. Lockheed Martin provided the booster for the failed
test of July 8th. The test was delayed for several hours due to
a problem with a fuel cell in the Lockheed Martin booster rocket,
and when it was finally launched the kill vehicle failed to separate
from the booster, which in turn triggered the failure of the kill
vehicle to destroy the mock warhead.
- Lockheed Martin
will pay the government $5 million to settle claims that two subsidiaries
overcharged the Navy for anti-submarine devices. U.S. Attorney
Paul Gagnon stated that the government paid between $1.8 million
and $3.8 million too much for products from Nashua-based Sanders,
a Lockheed Martin Company, and Marietta, Georgia-based Lockheed
Martin Aeronautics Co. He also noted that the settlement would
save the government the expense of a court battle over Lockheed's
pricing practices.
- A rash of
last-minute technical problems prevented Lockheed Martin's new
rocket from lifting off in May of this year. It was the third
delay in three days for the Atlas III, the first U.S. rocket to
be equipped with a Russian engine. A broken radar thwarted the
following try. In addition to the diplomatic and political issues
raised by the professed willingness of the Clinton/Gore administration
and the Bush campaign to share missile defense technology with
Russia, the problems with the Atlas III raise an additional warning
flag regarding such cooperative efforts.
- Lockheed Martin
is the prime contractor for the PAC-3 theater missile defense
system, which is running more than 30% over budget (or approximately
$233 million). Lockheed Martin may have to pay about $70 million
to cover its portion of the cost overrun.
- Lockheed Martin
is the prime contractor for the Army's troubled Theater High Altitude
Area Defense system (THAAD), which has succeeded in only 2 of
8 tests to date and was plagued by such serious problems that
there was talk in late 1998 of taking the program away from Lockheed
Martin and giving it to another contractor. A $15 million fine
against Lockheed Martin for poor performance was lifted last year
after THAAD scored two hits after six consecutive failures. Despite
the history of problems in the program, Lockheed Martin recently
received clearance to proceed to the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (EMD) phase of the THAAD project, which could be worth
up to $4 billion in contracts to the firm.
Raytheon
Raytheon, which
just a few years ago seemed like the "most likely to succeed" among
the new breed of military mega-firms, has been plagued by its own
problems lately, ranging from an embarrassing "recall" of hundreds
of Patriot missiles it had sold to U.S. allies after the 1991 Persian
Gulf War to an admission that it had not engaged in proper testing
of electronic components provided to the Pentagon.
- The Exoatmospheric
Kill Vehicle (EKV) being developed for the NMD program has been
the object of serious concern and criticism. The Welch panel stated,
"The visit to the Raytheon facility in Tucson highlighted the
impacts of the 'hardware-poor' nature of the EKV program. There
were no spares, no development articles, and no articles available
for parallel activities that could significantly reduce development
and test risk. The first article built appears to be the one that
will fly." The panel also pointed out that the EKV may not be
able to withstand the shock loads once mounted on the actual Ground
Based Interceptor booster, which will not be demonstrated until
2003 when the integrated GBI (operational version of the booster
and EKV) will be tested.
- Other technical
problems with the EKV have included fuel leaks, problems with
the Inertial Measurement Unit (which independently guides the
test kill vehicle in flight), and failure of components of the
IR sensor system on the EKV. The failure of the July 7th
NMD test was due in large part to the failure of the Raytheon
kill vehicle to separate properly from the Lockheed Martin booster
rocket. As a result, the sensors used to hone in on the mock warhead
were never turned on, and the vehicle sailed wide of its target.
- The Army had
to replace hundreds of PAC-2 missiles after problems with components
of the missile. While the Army is working with Raytheon to find
the root of the problem, so far they were able to pinpoint it
to the missile's black box, or the radio frequency downlink, which
sends signals back and forth to the ground station and the missile.
- As part of
a settlement with the government, Raytheon will pay back $1.06
million to the federal government for cutting corners on tests
of electronic weapons components.
- Raytheon Aerospace
Co., a subsidiary of Raytheon Co., has agreed to settle allegations
that it used a security firm to spy on a small competitor in Alabama
three years ago. Raytheon agreed to pay $16 million to AGES Group,
of Boca Raton, FL, to settle allegations that it had engaged in
at least three days of industrial spying that included video and
audio surveillance and thefts of documents.
- Raytheon agreed
to pay the federal government more than $400,000 to settle a claim
that its Beech Aerospace Services subsidiary overcharged the Pentagon
on a 1991 aircraft maintenance contract. The government claimed
that Raytheon double-billed for certain parts in maintenance work
that was performed at various sites around the world.
The Bottom
Line: Still Rushing to Failure
Given their inherent
conflicts of interest and their recent histories of fraud and mismanagement,
Boeing, Lockheed Martin, TRW and Raytheon must be closely monitored
-- by both the Pentagon and by a panel of outside experts on ANY
testing and research and development work they undertake on the
NMD program. Until an effective monitoring system can be established,
the Clinton Administration should suspend the NMD program and take
it off what the first Welch panel rightly described as its "rush
to failure."
Selected Sources
(consult the authors for additional details):
These source
notes included selected excerpts from key articles along with a
list of some of the major sources consulted in the production of
this report. For additional information, consult www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms,
as well as the web sites of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers
(www.crnd.org), the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace (www.ceip.org,
click on Nonproliferation Project), and the Federation of American
Scientists (www.fas.org, click
on Space Policy Project).
- New York
Times by Tim Weiner, August 27, 1993
"Last year, the
GAO audited seven 'Star Wars' tests between 1990 and 1992. The auditors
found that three of the tests were accurately described to Congress.
Those three tests were complete or partial failures. The missile
defense program's officials told Congress the other four tests were
successes. That was untrue, the auditors said.
The inaccurate
claims included the success rate of experiments, the progress of
the programs, the sophistication of the tests, the ability of interceptor
missiles to distinguish between a target and a decoy and the missiles'
achievement of accuracy and altitude goals, the GAO reported.
'They have lied
about certain functions that their missiles are supposed to perform,'
said a Federal investigator who agreed to speak only if he was not
identified. 'They've used things to enhance the target. The fact
is that you've got something up there solving your guidance problem.
And you've got an incentive to deceive. That's how you keep your
program going.'
A former Reagan
administration official, a nuclear physicist who closely studied
the missile defense program in the 1980s, said it was characterized
by 'secrecy, greed, self-deception, deception of Congress and actually
even of the President.' The former official, who remains a Pentagon
consultant and who spoke on condition of anonymity, is not among
the accusers in the debate."
- New York
Times by Tim Weiner, August 18, 1993
"Officials in
the 'Star Wars' project rigged a crucial 1984 test and faked other
data in a program of deception that misled Congress as well as the
intended target, the Soviet Union, four former Reagan administration
officials said."
- "Lockheed
Will Pay $13 Million to Settle Charges of Sharing Satellite Technology,"
by Helene Cooper, Wall Street Journal, June 15, 2000.
- "Report Hits
Lockheed Cost Cutting," by Tim Smart, Washington Post,
September 1, 1999.
- "Lockheed
Martin to Pay $5 Million," The Associated Press, May 21, 2000.
- "New Rocket
Runs Into Rash of Woes," The Associated Press, May 18, 2000.
- "Patriot PAC-3
Missile 37 percent Over Budget," by Tony Capaccio, Defense
News, June 21, 1999.
- "National
Missile Defense Review," Panel headed by Gen. Larry Welch, USAF,
released November 1999.
- DOD News Briefing
with Lt. Gen. Paul Kern, Military Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Logistics and Technology, March 23, 2000.
- "Raytheon
Settles for $1.06m," by Ross Kerber, Boston Globe, June
10, 2000.
- "Raytheon
Unit Settles Industrial-Spying Allegations," by Gregg Krupa, Boston
Globe, May 13, 1999.
- "Raytheon
Agrees to Settle Claim," Wall Street Journal, January 22,
1999.
- "A Missile
Defense With Limits: The ABC 's of the Clinton Plan," by William
Broad, New York Times, June 30, 2000.
- "Ex-Employee
Says Contractor Faked Results of Missile Tests," by William J.
Broad, New York Times, March 7, 2000.
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