a panel discussion with (in alphabetical order):

On April 29th 2004, a panel of journalists convened to discuss whether, in the light of the 2004 Russian presidential elections, Russia still matters. More than a decade after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the communist system, many have argued that authoritarianism has made its return to Russia. Is the overwhelming support for Vladimir V. Putin, demonstrated in the recent elections, a sign that Russia’s reforms are faltering? What is the role of Russia in today’s world, and what is Putin’s role as its President?

The panel is part of the project on New Post-Transition Russian Identity, sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and organized jointly by the New School University, The World Policy Institute, and the Harriman Institute at Columbia University.

Moderated by professor Nina Khrushcheva, the panel included Gideon Lichfield, Moscow correspondent to The Economist,Masha Lipman, Russian journalist and contributor to the Washington Post,Adam Michnik, founder and editor in chief of Gazeta Wyborcza, and David Remnick, editor in chief of The New Yorker, representing Western Europe, Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, and the United States, respectively.

Discussion Summary
(for a full transcript, Click Here)

Masha Lipman begins her illustration of Russia's present condition with a recollection of the "odd and mostly incomprehensible" billboards that appeared from time on time in Moscow in the late 1990's. Rather than carrying advertisements aimed broadly at the Muscovites who passed them every day, tempting them with some consumer item or another, these billboards, she explains, were each aimed at a specific individual or small group. The first billboard showed the face of a young woman and the words "I love you." While rumors as to the origins and meaning of the billboard abounded, the source was never verified. The billboard was eventually replaced with a different, yet equally incomprehensible billboard.

This use of "…common space for public purposes" - this "billboard game," persisted for a year. Lipman sees the game as indicative more broadly of the absence of public space in Russia. Using the theme of the "emptiness of public space," she compares the current situation in Russia with the Soviet and immediate post-Soviet situations.

The absence of public space in the USSR was official and unambiguous. "Everything beyond private space was state territory…” The late 1980's, on the other hand, were years of ballooning public space, embraced by a public who enthusiastically filled it with debate over recent newspaper items, the worthiness of politicians, etc. "Perestroika was about turning the country into one big public space," which culminated, eventually, in the end of the communist rule.

Lipman points out, however, that "…what Russia had in the late 1980's and very early 1990's was not institutionalized democracy – it was revolutionary excitement." When the "revolutionary euphoria" wore off, the democratic flavor that had suddenly appeared would just as suddenly turn bland.

Although the oppression is gone, Lipman argues that the absence of public space, “the alienation between state and society,” resembles that of the Soviet days. The channels of communication between the Russian state are basically nonexistent, as evidenced by the mystery surrounding the firing of former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov weeks before the elections and the lack of debate over pension reform. The government take-over of television networks was considered “…a conflict between the owner and government,” not a public concern. The government does not explain its actions to the people, and the people don’t demand any explanation from the government. No momentum exists behind public discourse; ideas vanish soon after they are voiced.

A mysterious letter recently appeared in a Moscow business daily. The letter was from Mikhail Khodorkovsky and was addressed to the readers of Vedomosti, the newspaper in which it appeared. Lipman proposes that the real audience Khodorkovsky was attempting to reach was the Kremlin. She points out that it is not Vedomosti readers, but the Kremlin who will decide Khodorkovsky’s fate.

“Khodorkovsky’s letter may be likened to the earlier cited “I love you” billboard. For the time being, however, the government’s response to Khodorkovsky has been “And I don’t love you.””

Amidst the widely varying opinions of the current situation in Russia, Gideon Lichfield frames his objective as a journalist in Russia as “…not only trying to understand Russia, but trying to understand the people who are trying to understand Russia.” He employs the metaphor of “living with Russia” as a “chronic disease,” one that produces contradictory ideas about the present condition of Russia. Why are there such disparate opinions of Russia?

First, he argues, “it depends on what aspect of Russia you’re looking at.” From a political and human rights perspective, the outlook is indeed grim. With public space collapsing, the government usurping control of television stations, and organizations promoting democracy being closed down or sent home, this viewpoint is certainly a valid one.

From the economic perspective, however, the outlook is much brighter. Lichfield points to ways in which Russia’s transition economy is steadily improving; “Russians have started having credit cards, taking out mortgages, having bank loans and having bank accounts at all.” These are quite positive signs for the Russian economy Lichfield says, signs that “…it’s beginning to be built as a proper economy from the ground up.”

Time scale is also important in deconstructing public opinion. Some are focused on the collapse of the Soviet empire and its aftermath—the revolutionary excitement followed by a prompt annihilation of all faith in democracy. On the other hand, many of those who compare the state of Russia today with that under communist rule find that vast improvements have been made.

Another factor that confounds opinion on the state of Russia is Putin himself. “Vladimir Putin has the most amazing ability to keep people guessing.” Although opinions on specific government policies are quite low, opinions of Putin, the man writing the policy, remain mysteriously high.

Lichfield suggests that we recognize the “inevitability” of Putin’s popularity, the desire of most Russians for stability, even at the cost of a return to some form of authoritarianism, and “Russian disillusionment with democracy.” Second, he proposes seeing Russia as a process that includes both positive and negative elements and is ongoing rather than “good” or “bad.”

Finally, Lichfield draws a comparison between Russia and Mexico, emphasizing that “…Mexico managed to succeed as a successful country and an undemocratic country at the same time.” Rather than imagining that Russia, “having been a great communist power,” should necessarily become “…a great capitalist power and a great democratic power,” he demonstrates “…how Russia could persist in this dual state of being politically, democratically rather dubious, economically, rather successful, and possibly, stable.”

Adam Michnik opens with an anecdote of Russian elections relayed to him by “an actual functioning Minister of Russian government.”

A raven sits in a tree. He has a piece of cheese in his beak. A fox is approaching him and he really wants the cheese; he really wants the raven to open his beak.

So he asks the raven: “Do you think that in the next presidential elections you’re going to be voting for Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin?”

The raven is silent.

The fox asks him again: “I didn’t come here of my own whimsy. I was sent here by the Federal Security Services, and I’m asking you a question. Are you going to vote for Putin?”

The raven is silent.

The fox, approaching him again says, “Not only was I sent by the Federal Security Services, but I also have friends in the mafia, and they are ready to come here and cut this tree that you are sitting on, and when they’re through with that, they’ll move on to your head. I ask you again: Are you going to vote in the presidential election for Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin?”

The raven opens his mouth. “Yes.” The cheese falls from his mouth, and the fox runs off with the cheese. The raven thinks to himself: “How stupid! If I’d said no, what would this have changed?”

From his self-described “Polish perspective,” Michnik differentiates between “two kinds of Russia that are dangerous: the imperial, expansionist Russia and the chaotic Russia.”

Yeltsin was representative of the chaotic Russia, a free but undemocratic Russia. Putin, on the other hand, is “a great stabilizer of the Russian state.” The stability that Putin brings, however, includes a suppression of any non-governmental powers, most recently, the oligarchs. The imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the intimidation others into exile, has “…broken the spine of the oligarchs.”

As the eagerness, or even willingness of Russians to publicly comment on political affairs diminishes, and as civil society is stamped out by the central authorities, Michnik asks: “What has happened that democracy has ceased to be needed in Russian society?”

First, the erosion of democracy that we see in Russia today is part of a more general global phenomenon, to which Poland, and the United States are also not immune. Second, “…Russia has an autocratic, not a democratic tradition.” Finally, there has been a tremendous disappointment with democracy in Russia. Democracy there has come to be “…characterized by corruption, theatrical spectacle, and the tossing around of words with no meaning.”

Michnik concludes by exposing the one opposition group that Putin has yet to suppress: the mafia. He poses the following question: “Will Putin be able to deal with the mafia as he has been able to deal with the oligarchs, the political parties, and the free media?” Michnik’s response to his own question is a definitive “no.” Arresting oligarchs, he argues, is much different than arresting mafia leaders. “This is where the real pluralism of interests is expressed in Russia,” he argues, and “perhaps paradoxically, it could turn out that this deadly conflict is the only real chance for Russian democracy.”

David Remnick illustrates the illusiveness of the Russian post-Soviet national identity, encapsulated in the failed attempts of Yeltsin-appointed teams, over long whiskey-filled (and, notably, vodka-less) nights, to devise such an identity. He laments: “Thirteen years have passed since 1991 and the collapse of the old order. We cannot easily deny that a new order far below our hopes and expectations has taken shape or is taking shape under the presidency of Vladimir Putin.”

Although Russia has failed to head decisively down the path towards a stable democracy, it does not, therefore, remain mired in “…a permanent set of dark attitudes, a collection of despotic, subservient arrangements and relationships.”

The reality of contemporary Russia is a “mixed bag…a postmodern soup.” The period of reform has witnessed both impressive successes and miserable failures. Disillusionment with democracy has followed from institutional collapse and corrupt liberalization. “In this atmosphere, the prestige of terms like “democracy” have suffered enormously, so that a democrat has long been called a dermocrat, a “shitocrat.””

From the U.S. perspective, “Putin is extremely pragmatic.” Generally supportive, he wants to be accepted by the West, and has shown flexibility to that end. Back in Moscow, however, “Putin is a creature of his earlier profession.” His suppression of the press, free enterprise, and civil liberties in general belie the face he propagates westward. Despite his popularity, which would easily have assured a victory, he resorted to harassing opponents and hijacking the media in an “…exercise in authoritarian overkill.”

The “atavistic Soviet habit” which colors Putin’s rule is unlikely to disappear soon. Indeed, Remnick contends that Putin is likely to “find a way, constitutionally or otherwise, to succeed himself.” The disappointment with which we resign ourselves to the reality of the “…KGB officer in the Kremlin,” however, should not overshadow what has changed for the better.

Remnick reminds us of “a thousand years of authoritarian brutality followed by eighty years of Soviet brutality.” Despite Russia’s missteps towards democracy, some progress has been made.

Second, he suggests that perhaps democracy has a better chance of success in Russia than any other option. “Indeed, Russia has tried just about everything else, and it has failed. That too is fast in the Russian memory.”

The reality of Russia’s present condition, then, is complex and often contradictory. There is no question that “Russia matters still.” The question is how it will continue to matter in the future: whether public space will remain a wasteland, which voices will be strong enough to challenge the government, and whether, as Remnick suggests, Russia is indeed “doomed to success.”

This transcript was prepared by Wendy Eberhardt, project on the New Post-Transition Russian Identity research associate.

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