If it succeeds, the universally condemned Honduran military coup could send a disastrous signal to Latin America and beyond that the long slog of democratization can be interrupted on a moment’s impatience.
Deposed President Manuel Zelaya’s past performance leaves much to be desired, but so do the nation’s institutions, which need democratic reform, not military mentorship. Honduras represents an archetypal “Tier-II” category of democracy. As a nation, it has underperformed in forming a broad democratic alliance, and often bent the rules to build the rule of law.
It needs time, patience, and nurturing—even when democratically elected leaders govern undemocratically.
The unpopular, populist President Zelaya built a narrow coalition, alienating the business community while attempting to overturn single-term limits on the executive office. Zelaya had damaged his democratic credentials by failing to respect judicial independence in disagreeing with the Supreme Court decision to strike down his planned plebiscite that sought to allow him to run for president again. The vote (which would have amended the constitution) was planned for this past Sunday—though it is not clear he intended it to be binding.
Things heated up even further when the chief of the army, Gen. Romeo Vasquez, refused to allow the army to provide logistical support for the referendum. Zelaya promptly fired him, and the Supreme Court jumped back into the fray, demanding he be reinstated. In the end, the military, legislative leaders, and the president failed to work out compromises, even with some mediation from the U.S. ambassador, to prevent the breakdown of democracy.
The new ruling authoritarian coalition claims to be using a constitutional solution to the crisis by protecting the new president, Roberto Micheletti, who was previously head of the legislature. Indeed, many Hondurans have argued that a coup did not actually occur, since the legislature and Supreme Court had declared Zelaya’s referendum and various other acts to have been unconstitutional. In response, the court played its own constitutional card, by ordering the armed forces to reestablish a “democracy.” Thus, Micheletti’s constant public refrain: “democracia, democracia, democracia.”
Barring the chorus of claims from both sides over what is “constitutional” and what is not, it is important to note that, most likely, this was a classic middle-class coup—a Brumarian moment of relief for the privileged, bolstered by constitutional distortions to correct constitutional distortions. Zelaya had won office on a conservative, law-and-order ticket but increasingly had adopted the populist tendencies of many of his fellow Latin American leaders, alienating broad swathes of the legislature and the business community.
Perhaps the new regime (if it remains in power) may actually keep its word and reconfigure itself democratically, as it claims. Occasionally, when democratic leaders govern undemocratically, a new authoritarian alliance can put things right. But, in practice, it is usually the exception to the rule and a pretext for other aims—all too often, it is might that makes right. Worse, coups signal that the military is to be the arbiter. But in Honduras, the “man on horseback,” as the military is depicted, often governs in nineteenth-century, caudillo (”strongman”) fashion, making order by giving orders.
Unanswered Questions
There are some curious puzzles that do not appear to make sense, however, in terms of tactical facts on the ground. Why would the president hold an apparently non-binding plebiscite and why would the army cancel it when Zelaya was apparently so unpopular? Was he planning on rigging the vote, or declaring victory after a small turnout? With regular elections scheduled for November, why would the president even think he could win re-election (assuming he succeeded in the plebiscite)?
Moreover, is the international community now putting the de facto regime in a corner out of which there is no face-saving solution without violence? What will happen once threatened economic sanctions are imposed if the president is not reinstated? And does the army fear becoming a pariah to the alliance of Cuba’s Raul Castro, Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega on the one hand and the United States and the rest of Latin America’s presidents on the other? Strange bedfellows indeed.
However popular and constitutional the new regime claims its actions to be, the simple fact is that the army remains on the streets. Yet, thus far, violence has been virtually non-existent. That could quickly change, if protesters are emboldened by calls from the United States, the United Nations, and the Organization of American States (OAS) to reinstate Zelaya.
Short of economic sanctions and military intervention, it is not clear the international community will be able to overturn this coup. (The OAS succeeded in overturning a coup in Guatemala in 1993, but failed in Peru when confronted with Fujimori’s “auto-golpe” in 1992.) The U.S. view is complicated by the former Bush administration’s visceral hatred of Chavez and Ortega, who are allied with Zelaya. Obama has no clear policy as of yet, but at least has had the good sense to condemn the coup.
On a more macro level, the extra-constitutional crisis in Honduras presents a predicament for democracy-builders around the globe. Should we encourage popular referendums to extend term-limits and avoid potential constitutional crises? Voting does give voice to the people, after all, and is perhaps the purest form of democracy. But what if these votes merely go to enshrine burgeoning populist despots? What then?
Unfortunately, constitutional recommendations from political scientists make their way very slowly into the world they observe. With the Honduran military now facing off against the international community, one fears there will be a lot of turmoil before these democratic theories and constitutional arguments inform policy on the ground.
Henry F. Chip Carey is associate professor of political science at Georgia State University. His forthcoming books are Dilemmas of NGO Peacebuilding (Palgrave MacMillan) and Repealing What You Sow: A Comparative Analysis of Torture Reform (Praeger).
Posted in Honduras, Latin America | Comments
Having just completed a disappointing aid-seeking tour to Europe and the United States, Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai returned to Zimbabwe to find a much-needed “welcome home” gift: 
A car bomb 
Since the European Union parliamentary elections some two weeks ago, Europeans have been putting themselves through a bout of navel gazing and introspection. People are asking what exactly is the purpose of the European Parliament when every country has its own legislatures, both national and local? Why did a record low number of voters turn out? Why did eastern Europeans—only recently liberated from the yolk of dictatorship which denied them the vote—cast fewer ballots than anyone else (with only a couple exceptions)? Why do the British talk as if membership to the European Union is a yoke around their necks?
Russian President Dimitri Medvedev 
In a