There is one thing important to keep in mind when talking about Russia—it doesn’t change. Not that it doesn’t change at all, of course. Buildings, fashions, leaders, regimes, or at least regimes’ names, all these change. And over the next quarter century, inevitably, revolutions will roar, the ruble will collapse or soar, just as over the past quarter century Soviet dissidents or Russian oligarch, have been imprisoned or exiled. This all happens. But neither the late czarist system, nor late-communism, nor post-communism was able to generate a viable alternative to a society where changes, when they do happen, result in a destructive and malfunctioning social order. This, I fear, is what Russia has in store for itself—and for the world—over the next quarter century. Continue reading…

These deals come at an ideal time for Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and other arms makers. The economic crisis will force some sort of re-evaluation of the Pentagon’s record budget, which is now at its highest level since World War II. Weapons systems on the chopping block could include Lockheed Martin’s F-22 and F-35 combat aircraft, Boeing’s costly and complicated Future Combat System (FCS) for the Army, and Northrop Grumman’s Virginia-class attack submarine. The big contractors won’t be out on the street begging for change, but they will be scrambling to support themselves in the style to which they have become accustomed during the Bush/Rumsfeld/Cheney years.

That means more lobbying, both to block Pentagon cuts and to advocate for even more lucrative exports. In the Clinton years, the arms industry’s agenda included promoting a new multi-billion dollar arms export loan fund; pushing tax breaks for weapons exporters; and lobbying for policy changes like the expansion of NATO (whose most visible non-governmental advocate was Lockheed Martin Vice President Bruce Jackson) that were likely to open up new markets. The full agenda of the industry in an Obama administration is less clear, but watch this space for details as they emerge.

As elaborated in my piece, the outlines of a more responsible arms transfer policy are relatively clear—more transparency and accountability in the dizzying array of military assistance programs that have sprouted up since September 11; a greater emphasis on human rights and conflict prevention in arms transfer decision making; and support for existing international efforts to curb dangerous systems like land mines and cluster munitions. The question is whether the Obama administration will make these common-sense initiatives part of its early first-term agenda, and how much the fear of potential “push back” from the arms industry may sway their decisions in this regard.

All of which is to say that advocates of curbing irresponsible arms exports need to make their voices heard early and often, both to get the attention of the new administration and to offer a counter-balance to the industry lobby.

William D. Hartung is the director of the Arms and Security Initiative at the New America Foundation and the co-editor of Lessons from Iraq: Avoiding the Next War (Paradigm Press, 2008). His article, “An Unstoppable Arms Trade,” can be found in World Policy Journal’s 25th anniversary issue, on newsstands now.

Few would have predicted 25 years ago India’s dramatic rise as a global economic force, imagined that one day the iconic British luxury brands Range Rover and Jaguar would be purchased by an Indian company, or believed that the United States would form a strategic partnership with a staunch ally of its Cold War enemy, the Soviet Union. In 1983, India’s claim to international attention was pretty much limited to its surprise win of the Cricket World Cup in England. This was a turning point for the game, no doubt, but hardly an event that augured the birth of a world power.

Yet, on the basis of its surprise leap over the past decade onto the stage of emerging powers, many are now predicting a fantastic future for India. They see India as the tortoise to China’s hare, the second-place runner who may look like he’s far behind but who in the end will out-distance the complacent champion. Viewed through this prism, India’s democracy is supposed to confer a special advantage over China’s state-directed system, messier in the immediate term perhaps, but better able to withstand in the long run the buffeting social, political, and environmental winds of rapid economic transformation. Continue reading…

Back 17 years ago, in the winter of 1991–92, when I was contemplating Israel’s future in World Policy Journal, it was supposed to be the dawn of a new age—and I was there. We were about to enter the roaring globalization years of the 1990s and to be downloaded into a borderless world in which the archaic nation-state would vanish.

Arabs and Jews, Muslims and Hindus, would cease fighting each other over holy temples and olive trees and emerge in our new and brave world as the prime agents of global commerce, competing over market shares and investment flows, as Tom Friedman’s McDonalds Law (“no two countries that had McDonalds had gone to war with each other”) had forecasted. The “new cosmopolitans” and “global hybrids” would be the winners in this nascent universe where the prime determinant for business, political, and cultural success would be a multicultural sense of self. Pass that Cuban-Chinese falafel, please. Continue reading…

On September 23, 2003, just six months after the American invasion of Iraq began, President George W. Bush went before the United Nations General Assembly to announce that he was prepared to make “the greatest financial commitment of its kind since the Marshall Plan” in order to help rebuild Iraq. At the same time, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, the top American civilian administrator in Iraq, was delivering the identical message to the Senate Appropriations Committee, telling the senators that America intended to do for Iraq what it had done for Europe following World War II.

In the five years since President Bush delivered his Marshall Plan speech, America has yet to restore basic services to many parts of Iraq, but the hope of providing the Middle East with foreign aid that will change it continues on. In his new book, A Path Out of the Desert, Kenneth Pollack, director for Persian Gulf affairs on President Clinton’s National Security Council, makes a passionate case for an American grand strategy in the Middle East that puts foreign aid front and center. Continue reading…

It’s October 2033 and Shahinaz Abdel- Salam, 55, has just been appointed Egypt’s first female interior minister.

She’s about to address the nation by live holofeed to explain why she’s accepted a post that as a young woman she’d always dreamed would be abolished because, in the Egypt where she grew up, interior minister was synonymous with “chief torturer.”

Her office is in New Cairo, an area which was once desert but over the past few years has buzzed with university campuses and businesses freed from the suffocation of downtown Cairo. But her address to the public will be made from what used to be the downtown headquarters of the Interior Ministry called Lazoghli. For years, the building’s underground dungeons had held hundreds of thousands of political prisoners—at its peak estimated to be around 20,000—mostly Islamists. Continue reading…

Though Africa is intimately connected to American politics, fortunately, its growing economies have not been undermined by the financial crisis.The financial crisis is primarily a developed world problem and will not reverse Africa’s recent pattern of economic growth. The growth of African economies has not been financed by Western capital, and so most economies are unlikely to be severely hit by the crisis. The International Monetary Fund still predicts average growth rates in Africa of 3 to 5 percent in 2009. Africa’s banks have been conservatively managed so they are not exposed to the toxic sub-prime investments.

The one exception is South Africa, a country whose economic growth has been financed by Western capital. Over the past few weeks, investors have frantically pulled out and, as a result, the rand has lost nearly half its value.

The rapid drop in oil prices does not seriously threaten Africa’s oil producers because most countries base their budgets on very conservative estimates of the price of oil. For instance, Nigeria’s budget is based on a benchmark price of $62.50 a barrel.

In recent weeks, my fears about the spread of organized crime in Africa have also been confirmed. Last week a group called the Bakassi Freedom Fighters kidnapped 10 crew members from an oil vessel off the coast of Cameroon. The raid resembled the attacks of gangs like MEND in the Niger Delta. The Cameroon raid is a dangerous sign that new criminal gangs throughout the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea region will emerge and easily replicate MEND’s methods. And, as I argued in my article, even if Western donors begin to recognize the severity of the threat, the battle against organized crime in Africa will be long and arduous.

Michelle Sieff is assistant director of the Africa Institute at the American Jewish Committee, and has served previously as an Africa analyst for the Eurasia Group and Human Rights Watch. Her article, “Africa: Many Hills to Climb,” can be found in World Policy Journal’s 25th anniversary issue, on newsstands now.

Firstly, the world financial crisis has worsened precipitously, which could impel a new American administration to break the cycle of expeditionary wars in Muslim countries in the Middle East.

Secondly, both the Pakistani Army in Pakistan and the American forces from Afghanistan have become more aggressive toward the Taliban and Al Qaeda, while at the same time offers of negotiation have been extended, mainly through the intermediary of the Saudis, to those who are considered the less extremist among the Taliban.

Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, a new cast of characters has arrived on the scene, principally: President-elect Barack Obama; and Gen. David Petraeus, the new head of the Central Command, whose writ stretches from Egypt and the Horn of Africa to the Indian subcontinent, including Pakistan and Afghanistan. Petraeus has already been to Pakistan to confer with the civilian and military leadership there.

Putting more troops into Afghanistan, as Mr. Obama recommended during the election campaign, would seem to be counterintuitive to history. The more Western troops that are introduced amidst the fiercely nationalistic Pashtuns and other Afghans seems likely to generate more resentment and more resistance. Meantime, civilian casualties continue to mount, both by American Predator drone attacks into Pakistan’s tribal areas and by Allied bombings and ground attacks in Afghanistan, provoking the legendary spirit of vengeance in that part of the world.

The Russian example in the twentieth century and the British example in the nineteenth century are there for all to see. Both were driven out of the country ignominiously. Afghans dislike intensely armed foreigners, especially Westerners, operating with impunity in their own country. Why turn our eyes away from this fact of history?

In the face of this negative past history, perhaps Gen. Petraeus and his impressive staff of counterinsurgency experts can come up with a new solution, which might include the co-opting of Pashtun tribal leaders. But I remain to be convinced: American and allied military remain in Afghanistan in what is seen by many Afghans as a colonial-style occupation force, while the principal enemy—al Qaeda—is not even in Afghanistan anymore but continues to enjoy a safe haven in Pakistan.

In the meantime, the secondary enemy—the Taliban—for having sheltered Al Qaeda enjoys at least the tacit support, in part due to fear, of a majority of the Pashtun population on both sides of the border. (The Taliban being overwhelmingly Pashtun, of course.)

There are many negative signs in this situation: the inability to stifle the opium poppy crop, which has become a significant part of the Afghan economy; the weak leadership in Kabul under Ahmed Karzai; the untested new civilian leadership in Islamabad under Asaf Ali Zardari, who is widely regarded as having a corrupt past; and the reluctance of many of the allied partners in the Afghan stabilization force (ISAF) to put their troops in harm’s way. These so-called “caveats” are having a poisonous effect on the publics of those allied countries whose troops are doing the fighting and sustaining casualties.

As I stated in my retrospective article, the time could come for the United States to make plain to Pakistan that if it cannot control its border, if it continues to allow terrorists to operate in Afghanistan from a safe haven inside Pakistan, then Washington would have to scale back its operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan while keeping its sights trained from afar on possible Al Qaeda operatives. The metaphor I used is, “You can’t air-condition a room with the windows open.”

A new U.S. president has the unique advantage of not having to be burdened by the actions of his predecessor. It is called change.

Charles G. Cogan was chief of the Near-East South-Asia Division in the Directorate of Operations of the CIA from 1979 to 1984. It was this division that directed the covert action operation against the Soviets in Afghanistan. He is now a historian and an associate of the Belfer Center’s International Security Program at Harvard University’s Kennedy School. His article, “Afghanistan: Partners in Time,” can be found in World Policy Journal’s 25th anniversary issue, on newsstands now.

Does the steep price drop remove politics from oil markets? Not at all. Look to recent headlines from three of the countries that have profited mightily from the windfall oil profits of the past few years.

In Iran, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the theocrats who hold real power in the country know that lower crude prices give them plenty to worry about. The International Monetary Fund has warned that when oil prices fall below $90 per barrel, Iran starts to run a budget deficit. When oil falls below $75 per barrel, it can’t afford its import bill. We got a glimpse of the jitters in Tehran in early October, when Iran’s oil minister announced that a price below $100 per barrel was “unacceptable.”

For a government that has ordered gasoline rationing and continues to fight a losing battle against 30 percent inflation, this is a serious problem. Iran’s government has increased spending by nearly 90 percent over the past three years. If that politically popular spending is to continue, where’s the money going to come from if not from energy exports?As profits slow to a trickle, Iran’s leadership will begin to sweat, fearing that its popular legitimacy rests only on a revolution that most Iranians aren’t old enough to remember and on Ahmadinejad’s ability to whip up national pride via fierce defense of the country’s nuclear program.

Unlike the ruling clerics, Ahmadinejad will face angry Iranian voters when elections come around in June 2009. To save his political hide, might he use a fresh round of threatening anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric to drive up oil prices and stoke Iranian nationalism? If so, he could create risks for vulnerable and cash-poor energy consumers. He could also push his country into some form of military conflict, intentional or unintentional, with the United States and/or Israel.

Venezuela’s government is vulnerable, as well. High inflation and a shortage of consumer products—the country imports virtually everything except crude oil—will eventually pose challenges for President Hugo Chavez. His government has used the national oil company PDVSA as a piggy bank over the past several years, “bleeding the company of the money it needs to maintain deteriorating infrastructure, to buy new equipment, and to invest in bringing new crude supplies on line,” as I wrote for WPJ. The result is falling oil output, a problem that could become acute as Chavez struggles to maintain his popularity in the years to come.

Both governments have amassed deep financial reserves over the past several years. But for the longer term, both will try to pressure Saudi Arabia to lead OPEC in the output cuts that might again lift prices and save them from their own profligacy.

Lower oil prices aren’t doing any favors for Russia’s government either.

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev remain popular, and the August conflict with Georgia has helped swell national pride. Stabilization funds created from state oil profits have helped the government support a stock market that has lost two-thirds of its value in recent weeks and inject much-needed cash into banks under heavy stress.

But the real story is that Russia’s government is using the financial crisis to strengthen its grip on key economic sectors. The first tranche of state loans to help Russian companies cover their foreign debts has gone out to large, politically well-connected companies that have strategic economic importance. The state now has considerably increased leverage over the future of these companies and the sectors they dominate. Russia is just one more oil producer that needs higher prices to finance this ambitious state agenda. We might even see signs of some limited cooperation between Russian and OPEC to coordinate efforts to push prices higher.

Oil prices will remain cyclical for years to come, and the impact of politics for energy markets (and of energy markets for politics) will continue to matter whether prices rise or fall. That’s the real story behind the geopolitics of oil.

Ian Bremmer, a senior fellow of the World Policy Institute, is the president of Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy, and the author of The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall (Simon & Schuster, 2006). His article, “Oil: A Bumpy Ride Ahead,” can be found in World Policy Journal’s 25th anniversary issue, on newsstands now.

By 2033, two states, Israel and Palestine, will be living side-by-side in an uneasy peace, with the risk of war between them and terrorism across their common border diminishing year by year. This two-state solution will not be imposed by the United States or the Arab world. It will be freely chosen by the Israelis and Palestinians themselves. The growing Palestinian majority living between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River will continue to insist on nothing less. And a solid majority of Israelis will by then have come to see a two-state partition of Palestine as essential to Israel’s survival as a tolerable place to live and raise their families.

That is not the only outcome possible for 2033. But it is the most likely—and it is the most attractive one for Israelis, Palestinians and the outside world.

Consider the alternatives.

The safest prediction for anywhere is normally some version of present realities, projected forward. But there is nothing safe or normal about the existing situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These territories are neither Israel nor Palestine, and their unfolding demographic arithmetic assures that they are not going to evolve into one or the other without very bold political decisions being taken by both sides. Continue reading…